

Governing Crime or Governing through Crime? “Security Pacts” as a Policy Instrument in Italy (2007-2009)

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Abstract

This paper explores the territorial dimension of the local security policies, with reference to the “Security Pacts” signed in Italy between 2007 and 2009. The “Security Pacts” are a negotiation instrument introduced by the central government, aiming at changing the model of security governance at the local level. After describing how “Security Pacts” spread and which institutional actors have participated in them, this study aims at deepening the analysis of their territorial dimension. More specifically, the research question at the basis of this study focuses on the identification of the causes which can explain why the “Pacts” involve a variable number and different types of public administrations at different levels and why they tend to acquire specific spatial configurations rather than others. Three hypotheses will be tested based on empirical data (obtained using a Quantitative Narrative Analysis and with the aid of Geographic Information Systems and statistical tools) in order to identify which variable may explain better than others the propensity to use negotiation tools to solve security-related issues in different areas of the country.

1. Background: What “Security Pacts” are, how they spread and who signed them (2007-2009)¹

The *security issue* is one of the core themes of the public discourse in so-called “full-grown democracies” (Hughes, McLaughlin and Muncie 2002) and it is closely connected to both the trend of crime, and the responses that the public (governmental, administrative, judicial, penal) authorities give to this social issue, and also to the perception that people have of both elements (Castels 2003; Simon 2007). During the last 15 years, in the political market - in

¹ Some parts of this article are based on Calaresu (2012, 2013).

particular as far as the citizens' demand is concerned - an increasingly higher demand for protection of public order has been recorded, requiring a more extensive guarantee for personal safety, a better protection against acts of terrorism and even a claim to live a quality life in conditions of "full security" (Boutellier 2004; Bauman 2005, 2008). Security became a real "obsession" (Curbet 2008) that citizens shared, or at least charged to their elected representatives at all levels of government (Garland 1996, 2001; Hughes and Edwards 2002). On the political offer side, at the same time, policy platform developed to meet that demand and to guarantee a more effective institutional response to the perception of insecurity voiced by the people (Lagrange 1992; Baratta 2001; Pavarini 2006b; Recasens 2007; De Micheli and Tebaldi 2013; Moroni and Chiodelli 2014).

Among different instruments used to inform such policies, we assisted to the spread of contractualization practices (Gaudin 1996, 1999; Bobbio 2000; Lascoumes and Le Galés 2004). Through them, policies are defined and implemented on different subjects, purposes, stakeholders, territorial scales² or scopes of action; but they may be generally regarded as explicit agreements on matters of public interest,³ submitted in written form, "in which the parties declare publicly to approve a plan or course of action, or mutual commitments, putting their own resources (not necessarily financial resources) available to a shared purpose, agreeing on when and how to implement it"⁴ (Bobbio 2000, p. 112). Italy is not an exception with regard to the above-mentioned contractualization processes. The topic of urban and local security, although later than in the UK and France (Braccesi 2005, p. 25; Selmini 2005a, p.

² Contracts can be "vertical", if they involve different levels of government on a different geographic scale, "horizontal" when they involve different local institutions, "functional" if they belong to the same level of governance. In several empirical cases, the simultaneous presence of both dimensions was detected (Bobbio 2006, p. 70, own translation).

³ The first aspect (the nature of the agreements) is functional to make a distinction between the research topic and the traditional negotiation policies. The second (matter of public interest such as the content of the contract) is necessary to make a distinction between a public contract and a private contract (Bobbio 2000, p. 113, own translation).

⁴ Own translation.

15-16) was developed in Italy by institutional reforms, in the late 90s (Amendola 2003; Mazzette 2003a; Selmini 2004, 2005b; Braccesi and Selmini 2005; Pavarini 2006a). However, since 2005, the relations of cooperation and collaboration between state institutions, regional and local authorities in the field of security have been institutionalized through the signing of new agreements (Calaresu 2012, 2013), designed to overcome the weaknesses of the previous inter-institutional cooperation model, tested during the so-called “first contractual season” (1998-2005).⁵ On March 20th, 2007⁶ a framework agreement on the security of urban areas was signed between the then Minister of Home Affairs Giuliano Amato and ANCI President Leonardo Domenici, and the mayors of the metropolitan cities.⁷ The National Pact was designed to initiate - within sixty days - as many agreements in the framework of a relationship of subsidiarity between public bodies and regional and local administrations.

Legislative decree No. 92, formalized on September 13th, 2008 with the drafting of another agreement between the National Association of Small Municipalities (ANPCI) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Law no. 125 of 2008), extends the application of the “coordinated plans of territorial control” and the strengthening of the logistics, instrumental and financial collaboration between state and local authorities provided for by the 2007 Finance Act, also to small and medium-sized contexts, selecting groups of municipalities where the “Pacts” could be implemented.

The dates reported above mark the days when the “second contractual season” started (2007-2009). These new generation instruments paved the way to a model of security governance different from the previous one, based on which local administrations seem to be

⁵ For more details, see Fiasco (2001, p. 26-27), Coniglione and Selmini (2007, p. 2), Antonelli (2010, p. 87-88), Calaresu (2013, p. 61-62), Procaccini (2003, p. 410), Le Galès (1997, p. 444), Giovannetti (2009, p. 131), Braccesi (2005, p. 30), Pavarini (2006b).


⁶ On the basis of Article 439 paragraph 1 of Italian Law No. 296/2006 (2007 Financial Act), prefects were authorized to enter into agreements with the regions and the local authorities for the implementation of special programmes.

⁷ Bari, Bologna, Cagliari, Catania, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Palermo, Rome, Turin.

granted the capability to acquire more powers and responsibilities with regard to urban and local security (Martin and Selmini 2000; Calaresu and Padovano 2011). The “Security Pacts” pursue indeed the objectives of collaboration between central and peripheral bodies, through the development of an integrated security system, with tasks and responsibilities distributed through negotiation among different governance levels (Calaresu 2012). In an attempt to start new forms of cooperation between the central government and the local level, the “Pacts” provide a two-fold additional function. On the one hand, they bind prefectures, that is, the peripheral bodies of the central government, to agree with the regional and local authorities some activities and share their information. On the other hand, they redistribute responsibilities in the prevention and control functions, allowing local police to cooperate in the fields of prevention and repression with the national services.

Between 2007 and 2009, 51 “Security Pact” were signed in Italy. The only subject that is always present when signing a “Pact” is the prefecture (an agency managed directly by the Ministry of Home Affairs) that signs the agreement with the Municipality, the Province, and the Region, thus generating different institutional configurations (figure 1).

Figure 1. Configuration of institutional actors involved in the “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) signed with the prefectures




Source: Own data processing.

The municipalities are the main actors involved in the signing of the “Pacts” with the prefectures. Indeed, only on one occasion does the provincial authority sign the agreement without involving the municipality (or more municipalities). The synergy between the municipality and the province is the most widely used - 40% of the cases - a bit higher (30%) than the agreements signed by a single municipality or a group of municipalities with the prefecture. The *full* institutional configuration, that involved all local authorities (region, province(s) and municipality(s)) is the least common, being perhaps the most difficult to obtain due to large number of institutional actors involved in the agreement.

2. Case description: Where have the “Security Pacts” been signed? A preliminary analysis on the geographical areas

The 51 analysed “Security Pacts” are not evenly distributed throughout the territory.⁸ As the image below suggests (figure 2), the “Pacts” are mostly used in the North West (39.22%) and the North East (23.53%) of Italy. Overall, the North (62.75%) had a highest score in comparison with the South (11.76%) and even more so with respect to the Islands (5.88%). Even adding the latter share with the percentages obtained from the South and the Centre of the peninsula, the percentage turns out to be slightly higher than half (37.25%) of the total of the northern regions (62.75%).

Figure 2. Distribution of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) by region




Source: Drafted using ISTAT demographic data.

⁸ The division is based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Italian Statistics (NUTS:IT) used for statistical purposes at the European Union (Eurostat 2008). The NUTS country codes suggest a subdivision into three levels: 1) Breakdown by Geographical Areas; 2) Breakdown by regions; 3) Division based on provincial borders.

As of December 31st, 2009, 241 Italian municipalities have been involved in the drafting and implementation of “Security Pacts”. Paying attention to their distribution on the territory, on the basis of their belonging to a specific demographic group, intended as a percentage of the total number of signing municipalities, a figure may be misleading is obtained (figure 3). At least, with respect to the common conception of security as a typical issue of large conurbations and metropolitan areas: indeed, 45% of the signatory actors are small and very small-sized Italian municipalities, that is, with a maximum number of 5,000 inhabitants.

Figure 3. Distribution of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) by demographic size and relative share with respect to municipalities with “Pacts”




Source: Processed using ISTAT demographic data

The figure does become more interesting when an additional 25% is added, including the share of municipalities ranging between 5,001 and 15,000 inhabitants (70% of the total number of municipalities). From this perspective, larger cities do not seem to be particularly

interested in contractualizing security policies, not exceeding a 5% share of the total number of signed “Pacts” (Calaresu and Padovano, 2011, p. 89). By checking the percentage of “Pacts” signed out of the total number of signing municipalities, however, the result is just the opposite (figure 4).

Figure 4. Distribution of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) by demographic size and relative share with respect to the municipalities belonging to the same category



Source: Processed using ISTAT demographic data.

The local administrations exceeding 250,000 inhabitants, reached 83.3% of the total (in other words, 10 municipalities out of 12 of the same class, undersigned covenants, that is, “Pacts”), while small-sized towns do not exceed 1.9% of the total number of Italian municipalities of the category (112 municipalities out of 5,739).

Table 1 shows both variables (geographical area and demographic range), providing information on the distribution of the 241 signatory municipalities within the 5 geographical macro-areas of interest: North West, North East, Centre, South and the Islands.

Table 1. Distribution of “Security Pacts” by geographical area and demographic size of the municipalities with “Pacts” (2007-2009)

constituency	up to 5000	5001 15000	15001 50000	50001 100000	100001 250000	over 250000	total
North West	67,97%	19,53%	3,91%	5,47%	0,78%	2,34%	100%
North East	19,51%	39,02%	24,39%	2,44%	7,32%	7,32%	100%
Centre	21,05%	23,68%	36,84%	5,26%	7,89%	5,26%	100%
South	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	33,33%	33,33%	33,33%	100%
Islands	24,14%	41,38%	13,79%	13,79%	3,45%	3,45%	100%

Source: Processed using ISTAT demographic data.

In the North West, nearly 90% of the signatory municipalities are reported to be small or very small in size (less than 15,000 inhabitants), with a widespread distribution of “Pacts” in the area. While in the South, the opposite seems to happen: the municipalities having signed the “Pacts” turn out to be only 3 in number, all of them being large-sized (between 50,000 and 250,000+).

3. Discussion and evaluation: The geographical configurations of the “Security Pacts”

3.1. Data and methods: From words to numbers (and maps)

After analysing the background data, we shall go deep into empirically relevant aspects connected to the dependent variable being taken into account, that is, the aspects that make it

possible to understand the “Security Pacts” signed in Italy between 2007 and 2009.⁹ The goal is to understand the geographical configurations of the “Pacts”.

Based on the linguistic and textual characteristics of the afore-mentioned documents,¹⁰ which may be considered as a generally “narrative” text, the Quantitative Narrative Analysis (QNA) methodology was implemented (Franzosi 2004, 2010). QNA is an approach that allows to structure the narrative information contained in documents.¹¹ Using software specifically designed for it, called PC-ACE,¹² a relational database system was generated (*07_SecuPacts_09*). More specifically, the relational properties of the database made it possible to convert words into numbers (Franzosi 2004), and to analyse them with the aid of Geographic Information Systems (GIS)¹³ and by means of statistical tools.¹⁴ More specifically, the ArcGIS software provided some spatial maps describing the relationships between the stakeholders, and related different data on the basis of their common geographical reference, highlighting the spatial distribution of “Security Pacts”.

The coding of the 51 “Security Pacts” under study - with a total of 487 pages of documents (and 2,671 performed “semantic triplets”¹⁵) - involved 11,652,444 inhabitants,

⁹ Agreements undersigned between 18th of May 2007 (the date of the first “Security Pact”) and 31st of December 2009 (the end of the period under study).

¹⁰ For further investigation on this matter, see Calaresu (2012, 2013).

¹¹ In a nutshell, Quantitative Narrative Analysis - through its “rewrite rules” (Franzosi 2010, p. 24) allows the encoding of “events” (Rimmon-Kenan 1983, p. 2), which are present in the source text and set them within the organizational structure consisting of narrative and also non-narrative data. The characteristics of the relational database thus generated allow for the extraction of information through the use of SQL (Structured Query Language), and a relevant data processing.

¹² The *Program for Computer-Assisted Coding of Events*, available at www.pc-ace.com, organizes information in a relational data format, with different text elements stored in different computer tables in the same database. PC-ACE does not do the hard work of automatically parsing text within the categories of a story grammar (Artificial Intelligence has yet to deliver on early promises of computer understanding of natural languages). All PC-ACE does (or any other currently available software of textual analysis, for that matter, except for basic word counts) is to provide a computerized tool that makes the task of sorting information within the categories of a story grammar easier and more reliable for a human coder.

¹³ GIS software is defined as an ICT system that allows the acquisition, recording, analysis, and visualization of spatial data and information derived from geographic data (geo-referenced data).

¹⁴ IBM SPSS Statistics Software 21, 64 bit. Microsoft Licensed version.


¹⁵ For a better understanding of the significance of the project, on the basis of the performed “semantic triples”, see Franzosi (2010, p. 139-140).

distributed in 241 municipalities, 31 are provincial capital cities (11 in the North West, 7 in the North East, 7 in the Centre, 3 in the South and 3 on the Islands) out of a total number of 103, that is, 30% of the total.¹⁶

As a first result of the GIS analysis of “Pacts”, figure 5 is used to associate each “Pact” signed on the area to a specific institutional configuration: despite the municipality/province/region configuration is the least common from a numeric point of view, the map suggests however that the dissemination of this combination is connected to strategic and wider areas (such as, the city of Rome, Genoa, Bari, Bologna, as well as Venice, Florence and Perugia). Figure 6 reports the distribution of the signatory municipalities on the Italian territory, showing a detailed description of the geographical and institutional boundaries of the local authorities engaged in the “Pacts”. Figure 7 and figure 8 show the geographical position of the 28 provincial governments and the 7 regional entities respectively, which undersigned the “Pacts”.

Figure 5. Institutional configuration of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009)

¹⁶ Part from the city of Palermo – that postponed the signing of the “Pact”, since local elections were being held at that time – all metropolitan areas that signed “Pacts” with the Ministry of Home Affairs complied with their commitment to adopt their own “Security Pact” within the limit of 60 days from the signing of the National Pact.




Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.

Figure 6. Municipalities with "Security Pacts" (2007-2009)



Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.

Figure 7. Provinces with “Security Pacts” (2007-2009)



Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.

Figure 8. Regions with “Security Pacts” (2007-2009)



Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.

3.2. Why there? Three hypotheses on security localization

This section focuses on the identification of the reasons why local administrations tend to use “Pacts” as negotiation instruments to solve security-related issues in different areas of the country. In particular, it focuses on the analysis of the reasons which may persuade administrations to create specific geographical configurations; namely to adjust this tool based on specific spatial and administrative boundaries, and with specific goals, rather than others.

The following paragraphs will provide an empirical test of three hypotheses:

hp. 1: The specific territorial configurations of “Security Pacts” depend on the *political colour* of the majority party running local institutions. The “Pact” is the result of specific policy choices connected to the will of the political parties involved and tend to occur whenever the institutions that initiate the “Pact” have the same political affiliation.

hp. 2: Regardless of their *political colour*, the spatial configurations of the “Security Pacts” depend on the size and demographic density of urban areas. The most densely populated regions tend, indeed, to be those with the highest concentration of criminal acts and therefore, they require institutional arrangements to combat the social disadvantage that crime generates. In this case, the “Pacts” acquire specific spatial configurations, since such configurations are the most-likely institutional response to the geo-localization of crime.

hp. 3: Regardless of their *political colour*, range, demographic density and the resulting geo-localization of crime, the “Security Pacts” are connected to specific territories and their social and economic features, characterized by high levels of well being and the quality of life of their inhabitants. Although smaller and isolated on the territory, the wealthier communities are able to mobilize resources for the pre-emptive protection of the territory, thus anticipating

the possible causes of social disadvantage related to crime. We can therefore hypothesize that the middle class tends to activate specific defence strategy of its status and its well-being; whereas its spatial isolation makes ineffective the land-based security models (in example: the urban-centred security model).

3.3. Do politics matters? “Security Pacts” and the connotation of the political majority

This section aims at testing our first hypothesis: that is, the one identifying the *political colour* of governments at different levels as the independent variable determining the localization of the use of the “Security Pacts”.

First, we should ask ourselves whether “Pacts” (as a whole, regardless of the number of local and regional signing parts) had a specific political connotation, whether they were implemented mostly by the *right-centre* or *left-centre* local administrations. With this aim in mind, and by using the data extracted from the Registry of Local and Regional Directors - Department of Internal and Territorial Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs, each administration involved was labelled as *right-centre*, *left-centre*, and *other*,¹⁷ based on the affiliation of the mayor, and/or the president of the region or the province, having signed the

¹⁷ The label *other* refers to an event including administrators not belonging to the main political parties, based on data extracted from the Ministerial Registry, meaning not belonging to any of the following categories: *centro-destra*, *centro-sinistra*, *centro-destra* and *centro-sinistra* with *contrassegni ufficiali*; *liste civiche*.

In detail (as reported by the Registry and in alphabetical order):


- Alleanza Popolare (ALL. POP.);
- Centro;
- Contadini Monarchici (CM);
- Lista civica (various);
- Lista Civica Indipendente;
- Unione Democratici Cristiani (UDC);
- Unione Democratici Cristiani – others;
- Uniti per Cambiare;
- Lega Nord (LN);
- Lega Nord – others;
- Margherita (DL).

The *other* category also includes the cases not uploaded on the Ministerial database (reported by the Registry as: *unspecified*) and the cases reporting missing and unavailable information (see Associazione Openpolis 2014). And also, the municipalities managed by external commissioners (reported as: *Commissario Prefettizio*) at the time of the signing of the “Pact”.

“Pact” at the time of their election.¹⁸ By summing up the different *positions* - including the political connotation of the national government at the time of the signing of the “Pact” - each pact was labelled as *homogeneous* or *mixed*. *Homogeneous* meaning that within the “Pact” each administration involved belonged to the same political area, resulting in the presence of a prevailing orientation (*right-centre* or *left-centre*). On the other hand, *mixed* referring to the absence of such political orientation. *Inhomogeneous* is reported when at least one of the contracting actors belonged to a political area different from the rest of the signatories. The diagram below (figure 9) shows the results of the above-mentioned process: interestingly, the “Pacts” do not show any particular political connotation. The administrations implementing this instrument do not seem to belong to a specific political area, while a slightly higher number (39%) of *mixed* “Pacts” is reported.

Figure 9. Political connotation of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) out of a total number of 51 documents, based on the signatory administrations and the national government

¹⁸ This is the only piece of information made available by the Registry of Local and Regional Directors. Please note that, since the time of the signing of the “Pact”, the political connotation of the local administration might have changed.




Source: Own processing of the data extracted from the Register of Local and Regional Directors - Department of Internal and Territorial Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Keeping the single pact as the reference unit of measure, it is possible to identify connections between the *political colour* of the “Pacts” and the national geographical distribution by macro-area. Most interestingly, in the North West of the country 60% of the “Pacts” were signed by *right-centre* political majorities, including the national government in charge at the time of the agreement. This is almost certainly due to the greater spread of *right-centre* administration in the area, with respect to the national total number, as well as the greater presence of small and very small-sized municipalities in the region (with respect to the national number). Since consolidated data are not available, such statement may not be confirmed hereby.

If the unit of reference changes, moving from the single pact to the 241 municipalities involved in the signing of the 51 documents analysed, the result is the same. 57% of the signing signatory municipalities, indeed, belong to the *mixed* group, while the *right-centre* and *left-centre* municipalities share the remaining *pie* (figure 10). This is the result of the fact that 45% of the municipalities involved in “Security Pacts” are small and very small-sized

municipalities (see figure 3 and figure 4), where the so-called *civic lists* or *independent groups* are widespread, as well as the *personal parties* which may not be labelled neither as *left-wing* nor *right-wing*.

Figure 10. Connotation of the political majority of the municipality and signing of the “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) out of a total number of 241 signatory municipalities, regardless of the affiliation of the national government



Source: Own processing of the data extracted from the Register of Local and Regional Directors - Department of Internal and Territorial Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The picture changes when the institutional configuration associated with the political connotation of the “Pacts” is taken into account, based on the *mixed-homogeneous* political connotation process described above (table 2).

Table 2. Institutional configuration and *mixed-homogeneous* political connotation of the “Security Pacts” (2007-2009), taking into account the political connotation of the national government

institutional configuration	right-centre	left-centre	mixed	tot.	% rc	% lc	% m.	tot.
municipality	6	3	8	17	35,2%	17,6%	47,0%	100%
municipality/province	11	1	9	21	52,3%	4,7%	42,8%	100%
municipality/province/region	0	9	3	12	0,0%	75,0%	25,0%	100%
province	1	0	0	1	-	-	-	100%
total				51				

Source: Data extracted from the Register of Local and Regional Directors - Department of Internal and Territorial Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The table above shows that, taking into account the *full* institutional configuration - the agreement is reached between the local authorities (region, provinces and municipalities) together with the prefectures - 75% of the “Pacts” were finalized by *left-centre* administrations with the presence of a national government of the same political affiliation. On the other hand, *right-centre* administrations did not manage to obtain the same results (0%). Keeping in mind that the *full* configuration was the least common (Table 2), being perhaps the most difficult to obtain due to the large number of institutional actors involved in the agreement, we observe how the contracting *left-centre* stakeholders turned out to be the most effective to reach an agreement on a shared medium to long-term project, or at least they were more likely to reach such agreement than those belonging to the *right-centre* area, including a large number of institutional actors. On the other hand, the administrations of the *right-centre* wing relied on the collaboration between the municipality and the province (52.3%), excluding the region.

3.4. Size of population, demographic density and “Security Pacts”. Which kind of relationship?

This section is dedicated to the empirical test of our second hypothesis. The hypothesis emphasizes the correlation between demographic density, the probability of criminal behavior

and the need for the government to implement “Security Pacts” to combat the social disadvantage that crime generates.

The analysis will focus on the “Pacts” signed in the areas of Milan, Varese and the Como Lake area. The use of such instruments in the area, as figure 11 shows, is widespread, since it affects a large number of administrations (89 municipalities), with different institutional configurations (municipality and municipalities/provinces). The map shows the *institutional boundaries* of the “Pacts”, starting with the “Patto per Milano sicura” that involve the municipality and the Prefecture only. Milan appears as a *compact city*, the capital of a densely populated province in the centre of a metropolitan area (see Allulli 2010; Allulli and Tortorella 2014) that stretches to the North and North East through a *diffused* urban settlement, reaching the towns of Busto Arsizio and Gallarate; the latter also signed a “Security Pact” each, in collaboration with the Prefecture of Varese. A little further to the North, Varese (the capital city of the province) is located, with its own “Pact” signed in agreement with the Prefecture. Turning to the West, near the Swiss border, the city of Como is located, that reached an agreement with its Province and the Prefecture, as part of the in the “Patto per Como sicura” initiative. Around the provincial capital city, a sparsely populated area stretches (i.e. an area with a low ratio between the number of inhabitants and the surface area), where the smaller towns (only in some cases with more than 5,000 inhabitants), *teamed up* to agree on a number of “Pacts” within the same province. For instance, the municipalities located within the “Como belt”¹⁹ mark a *safe zone* that surrounds the city of Como as a whole. A bit South from there, three separate covenants (“Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Mariano Comense”, “Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Canturina”, “Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Bassa Comasca”) involving 35 municipalities²⁰ mark an

¹⁹ Capiago Intimiano, Carimate, Cermenate, Cucciago, Figino Serenza, Novedrate.

²⁰ Alzano del Parco, Alzate Brianza, Appiano Gentile, Arosio, Bregnano, Brenna, Bulgarograsso, Cabiato, Cadorago, Carbonate, Cantù, Capiago Intimiano, Carimate, Carugo, Cermenate, Cirimido, Cucciago, Fenegrò,

additional *belt* around the city border. The “Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Olgiatese” completes the belt around the city of Como, involving a vast area to the West of the city, where no municipality exceeds 5,000 inhabitants.²¹ To the North, also the *triangle* underneath the two stretches of the Como Lake area, is included in a “Pact” (“Patto locale di sicurezza urbana dell’area Triangolo Lariano”), as the result of the institutional joint initiative of the Prefecture, the Province of Como, and a multitude of small-sized municipalities not exceeding 5,000 inhabitants.²² The area above is characterized by being a part of an area of *privileged* conditions in terms of wealth and tourism. Along the national border, near the Maggiore Lake, another *Pact area* is signed with characteristics similar to the previous one (“Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Lepontine Meridionali”); it is also an area with a deeply rooted historical and environmental value, characterized by the presence of *not urbanized* municipalities²³ (Chiodini and La Nave 2010, p. 32-33).

Figure 11. Distribution of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) in the areas of Milan, Varese, Como Lake (2007-2009)

Figino Serenza, Guanzate, Inverigo, Limido Comasco, Locate Varesino, Lomazzo, Lurago d’Erba, Lurago Marinone, Mariano Comense, Monguzzo, Mozzate, Novedrate, Oltrona San Mamette, Rovellasca, Rovello Porro, Turate, Veniano, Vertemate con Minoprio.


²¹ Albiolo, Beregazzo, Binago, Bizzarone, Cagno, Castelnuovo Bozzente, Cavallasca, Drezzo, Faloppio, Gironico, Lurate Caccivio, Olgiate Comasco, Parè, Roderò, Ronago, Solbiate, Uggiate Trevano, Valmorea.

²² Barni, Bellagio, Carlazzo, Blevio, Brunate, Caglio, Civenna, Faggeto Lario, Lasnigo, Lezzeno, Magreglio, Nesso, Pognana Lario, Rozzago, Sormano, Torno, Valbrona, Veleso, Zelbio.

²³ Bene Lario, Cavargna, Corrido, Cusino, Grandola e Uniti, Menaggio, Plesio, Porlezza, San Bartolomeo Val Cavargna, San Nazzaro Val Cavargna, San Siro, Valrezzo, Valsolda.

Signatory municipalities – details of the Milan, Varese, Como Lake area

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
|  National borders |  Patto locale di sicurezza urbana area bassa comasca |  Patto locale di sicurezza urbana cintura di Como |
|  Regional borders |  Patto locale di sicurezza urbana area lepontine meridionali |  Patto per Como sicura |
|  Provincial borders |  Patto locale di sicurezza urbana area canturina |  Patto per Milano sicura |
|  Municipal borders |  Patto locale di sicurezza urbana area mariano comense |  Patto per la sicurezza tra la Prefettura e il Comune di Busto Arsizio |
|  Provincial capital cities |  Patto locale di sicurezza urbana area olgiatese |  Patto per la sicurezza tra la Prefettura e il Comune di Gallarate |
|  Smaller cities (<5000 inhabs) |  Patto locale di sicurezza urbana area triangolo lariano |  Patto per la sicurezza tra la Prefettura e il Comune di Varese |




Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.

What happens in the Milan-Como-Como Lake territory seems to have many similarities with what occurs within the boundaries of the Garda area (figure 12), as well as in the Florence area (figure 13). As figure 12 shows, the use of pacts in the Garda area is widespread across a great number of local administrations (28 municipalities), with different institutional configurations (municipality and municipalities/provinces). The city of Verona and the city of Brescia, on the sides of the map (figure 12), confirm the trend of medium-large cities, to agree security arrangements directly with the Prefecture, while in the Garda Lake area, small-sized *administrative bodies* (in very lowly populated areas or *non-urbanized* areas) join and protect a region characterized by a remarkable quality of the landscape natural and historical resources, as well as by high concentrations of “wealthy” economies (*ibid.*). The “Patto per la sicurezza dell’area del Lago di Garda” includes an association of municipalities mostly with less than 5,000 inhabitants within an area that has a “tourist” vocation (*ibid.*, p. 104) and high levels of social well-being and wealth.²⁴ Figure 12 shows that the “Patto per la sicurezza dell’area del Lago di Garda” signed by the Prefectures of Verona and Brescia (as well as the Port Authority of Venice) marks a new cross-provincial *institutional* border, thanks to the participation of the Provinces of Brescia, Verona and Trento, going beyond the traditional administrative partition of the area.

Figure 12. Distribution of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) in the Garda area

²⁴ Arco, Bardolino, Brenzone, Castelnuovo del Garda, Desenzano, Garda, Gardone Riviera, Gargnano, Lazise, Limone del Garda, Lonato del Garda, Malcesine, Manerba del Garda, Molina di Ledro, Moniga del Garda, Nago Torbole, Padenghe sul Garda, Peschiera del Garda, Riva del Garda, Salò, San Felice del Benaco, Sirmione, Tignale, Torri del Benaco, Toscolano Maderno, Tremosine.




Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.

The same applies to the area of Florence (figure 13), starting with the “Patto per la sicurezza dei comuni del Circondario dell’Empolese Valdelsa”. Signed by 11 local administrations with the Prefecture of Florence, it covers an area characterized by low levels of urbanization,²⁵ in a territory once again characterized by a very high environmental value, as well as by high levels of social well-being and wealth (*ibid.*). Compared to the cases described above, however, two peculiar behaviours of local administrations are to be noted: the city of Prato – “Patto per Prato sicura”, and the city of Florence – “Patto per Firenze sicura”, which are medium to large-sized cities as well as provincial capitals, found it necessary to sign pacts in

²⁵ Capraia e Limite, Castelfiorentino, Cerreto Guidi, Certaldo, Empoli, Fucecchio, Gambassi Terme, Montatone, Montelupo Fiorentino, Montespertoli, Vinci.

addition to the ones with the Prefecture, trying to enlarge the use of the negotiation instrument and the coordination with other local authorities. As far as Prato is concerned, the pact also involved the Province of Prato and Tuscany Regional Authority. On the other hand, in Florence, in addition to the Province and the Region, several small towns were involved²⁶ in a *peripheral* area characterized by a high environmental profile (*ibid.*, p. 38).

Figure 13. Distribution of “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) in the Florence area



Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.

Based on the data described in figure 11, figure 12 and figure 13, we may draw a picture of the *contractual behaviour* adopted by the administrations involved in the subscription of “Pacts” (2007-2009): 1) firstly, as we expected, a widespread use of the pactional instruments

²⁶ Bagno a Ripoli, Calenzano, Campi Bisenzio, Fiesole, Impruneta, Lastra a Signa, Pontassieve, Scandicci, Sesto Fiorentino, Signa.

may be attached to provincial capital cities, as well as to cities ranging between 50,000 and 250,000 inhabitants, which serve as local *poles of attraction* (Milan, Varese, Gallarate, Busto Arsizio, Como, Brescia, Verona). This particular administration doesn't seem to feel the need (with the exception of Florence and Prato) for an agreement with the nearby municipalities, nor with the provincial or regional authorities, possibly believing that a single “Pact” undersigned with the Prefecture would be enough. The high demographic density as well as the social and economic characteristics of the territory suggest that this type of conurbations may suffer from security issues related to high predatory crime rates or migratory waves typical of *hot* suburbs or neighbourhoods characterized by urban decay and/or social issues;

2) secondly, a frequent use of this pactional instrument is observed among "associated" small and very small-sized administrations, located in what Giovanni Maciocco labels as “empty landscapes”, as opposed to those “more densely developed” (2007, p. 30). This solution was explicitly encouraged by article 17 of Law 128/2001, supplemented by article 7 of Decree-Law of May 23rd, 2008, No. 92 (as amended by Law of July 24th, 2008, No. 125), which provided for smaller municipalities or an association thereof to manage in associated form any security-related issues. They enjoyed the technical support of the National ANCI Association – in order to ensure “an adequate exercise of municipal powers in matters connected to law enforcement, in particular to facilitate the enhancement of the intervention capacity of local police in ordinary activities and to facilitate State Police Corp, the *Carabinieri* Legion and the *Guardia di Finanza* in their involvement in crime prevention activities and control of the territory” (Antonelli 2010, p. 93-94).

The outcome of this recommendation was not obvious at all, for three reasons: first of all, because it was not clear how each municipality would feel about it. As a second reason, because the legislative dictation granted parties involved to freedom to choose the most appropriate partners to achieve security-related objectives. Thirdly, because although the

association aimed at “managing security-related issues” and provided for generic objectives to be achieved (such as, strengthening the capacity of local police to deal with ordinary crime), it was clear that the reasons leading the mayors of small towns such as Castelfiorentino, Fiesole, Desenzano, Garda, Cusino (just to name a few) to sign a “Security Pact”, could not be the same as the mayors of intensely urbanized areas²⁷ such as Milan, Brescia and Varese. The analysis of *contractual behaviours* pursued by the contracting authorities is, therefore, necessary to understand how the individual municipalities have adjusted the legislative framework to these aspects; and in particular, the possible selective incentives (positive or negative) which may have brought smaller municipalities to sign an agreement on security-related matters.

The maps described in figure 11, figure 12 and figure 13 show how administrations in areas with a low or very low demographic density, and geographically far from the regional capital city (Como Lake area, the areas of Florence, Empoli, Garda Lake) decided to adopt a “Security Pact”, joining together with the Province and the Prefecture (more rarely with the regional authority and/or with the capital city of reference, except in the case of Florence and Prato). As already noted, the guiding thread connecting all municipalities is the *high historical value*, the high levels of social well-being and wealth of its population. In this sense Maciocco’s words (2007, p. 30) seem to be confirmed by the results of empirical data processing: “[...] alternative reference points from the stereotypes of the compact city, refuting the widespread assumption that the city is the ‘only thing of interest’ [...]”. Empirical data highlight that local governments put into practice what was suggested by sociologists who studied the connection between urbanism, urban planning and the institutions.²⁸ They prove to have enough

²⁷ Likely to be connected to the incidence of predatory crime rates or migratory waves in *hot* suburbs, or neighbourhoods characterized by urban and/or social decay, as well as issues related to urban redevelopment.

²⁸ On this matter, see Antonietta Mazzette: “[...] [Territorial] governmental policies should be based on an overall idea of what happens in a certain area, rather than individual local limited skills. But this means overcoming strict administrative boundaries and rethink the territory as a composite urban system” (2003b, p.

institutional intelligence to draw new borders, identifying a security area based on specific social and economic features, rather than sticking to the traditional Italian administrative partition (Municipality, Province and Region).²⁹ In some cases, the new *institutional* border acquires a cross-provincial (in addition to a cross-municipal) profile, that is, able to go beyond the *traditional* provincial borders (Brescia, Verona and Trento) (figure 12).

3.5. The social and economic features of urban areas and “Security Pacts”

The third case aims at understanding whether the social and economic well being is to be considered a significant factor to explain the propensity to use “Security Pacts” in specific areas and in specific inter-institutional configurations. The three highlights (Milan-Como-Como Lake area, the area of Benaco, the Florence area) suggest that there may be some kind of correlation between the contractual instrument (specifically, signed by municipal authorities) and the levels of social well being and wealth of the area. Other authors have already explored this type of assumption. Battistelli and Lucianetti (2010), for instance, argue that such high living standards, accompanied by high levels of economic development, lead to the development of post-materialistic needs (Inglehart 1996); which in turn would result in “forms of participation, aesthetics and self-fulfilment”³⁰ (Battistelli and Lucianetti 2010, p. 46). Thus boosting, within the political security market, both the demand side and the supply side of the security good. Battistelli and Lucianetti regard Italy as a country “split in half”³¹ (*ibid.*): the North representing the emergence of post-materialist needs, such as urban security; while the South (or

24, own translation).

²⁹ The issues related to institutional representation, moreover, are a long-time concern for the Italian cities, regardless of their demographic density and their extension. The issue connected to borders, for instance, is closely related to the allocation of competences and institutional responsibility. Also for this reason, many regard the institutional traditional boundaries as not adequate any more, and so is the allocation of competencies among the actors: “[...] the administrative boundaries still taken into account, have [therefore] become an obstacle and hinder the most important dynamics taking place on the territory” (Mazzette 2003b, p. 24, own translation).

³⁰ Own translation.

³¹ Own translation.

rather, the *Mezzogiorno*) “oppressed by structural setback”³² (*ibid.*), cannot meet the citizens’ need for employment and personal safety.

In order to formalize this hypothesis, we might say that municipalities with a higher level of social well being and wealth (in this case regardless of their population), are more likely to use “Security Pacts” (thus demonstrating a higher security-related interest); whereas it is expected that the municipalities with a low level of social well-being and wealth have a minor interest towards the same type of instrument.

In order to test the validity of the hypothesis, available data (referred to “Pacts” signed by municipalities, during the years 2007-2009) are cross-checked with data released by Eurostat³³ (for the year 2007); relevant to the per capita gross domestic product (GDP),³⁴ measured in terms of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)³⁵ by macro-geographical area.^{36 37}

Figure 14. Percentage of municipalities with “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) and GDP per capita PPS by geographical area

³² Own translation.


³³ Useful to represent the geographical distribution of wealth.

³⁴ As a definition of the Gross Domestic Product: “GDP, and thus GDP per inhabitant, provides a measure of the total economic activity in a region. It may be used to compare the degree of economic development of regions. GDP does not measure the income ultimately available to private households in a region” (Eurostat, 2008, p. 2, footnote 1).

³⁵ The PPS (purchasing power standard) is an artificial currency that takes into account differences in national price levels. This unit allows meaningful volume comparisons of economic indicators over countries” (Eurostat, 2008, p. 2, footnote 2).

³⁶ As reported in Eurostat (2008, p. 2 footnote 3): “These data are based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) as last modified in February 2007. NUTS 2006 provides a uniform, consistent breakdown of territorial units for the production of regional statistics for the EU. Level 2 of the nomenclature has 271 regions: Belgium (11), Bulgaria (6), the Czech Republic (8), Denmark (5), Germany (39), Ireland (2), Greece (13), Spain (19), France (26), Italy (21), Hungary (7), the Netherlands (12), Austria (9), Poland (16), Portugal (7), Romania (8), Slovenia (2), Slovakia (4), Finland (5), Sweden (8) and the United Kingdom (37). Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta are all considered as single regions at NUTS 2 level. For a list of the European statistical regions see: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts>”.

³⁷ The vertical and horizontal line in the figure corresponds to the average values (see figure 14).



Source: Processing of Eurostat “Regional GDP per Inhabitant 2007 in the EU27”. Released 18 February 2010.³⁸ Demographic data source: ISTAT. Image: SPSS.

As a result, our initial hypothesis is confirmed in four out of five cases (figure 14). The empirical evidence shows that a high level of income (GDP per capita, PPS) is connected to the highest percentages of municipalities signing a “Security Pact” during the period taken into consideration. In the North West, where the highest levels of income are reported, also the highest percentage of “Pacts” is registered. The North East and Central areas are reported below. The South has the lowest income levels and the lowest number of Pacts signed. The exception is the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia) which have values similar to Central Italy as for the percentage of pacts implemented, but rather lower with regard to the gross wealth per capita (GDP-PPS).

³⁸ "In 2007, the GDP per inhabitant in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) terms, in EU 27, ranged between 26% of the EU-27 average in the region of Severozapaden (Bulgaria), and 334% of the average of Inner London (UK)" (Eurostat 2008, p. 1).

The picture is the same if the available data related to the “Pacts” signed by the municipalities (during the same period of time) are coupled with another social and economic welfare indicator: the *quality of life* in Italian municipalities, published on an annual basis by Italia Oggi (2007)^{39 40} Such value is measured based on seven different indicators, so as to capture different aspects of the social and economic welfare connected to the GDP level: 1) business and labour; 2) the environment; 3) crime; 4) poverty; 5) services; 6) leisure; 7) general. The latter 7) was used for our test.


The results show that Southern Italy has the lowest level of social and economic welfare (*quality of life*) and the lowest relative share of signatory municipalities. Even using the general index of *quality of life* as a measure of well being, the North West, the North East and Central Italy are at the top of the Italian ranking, with a higher percentage of “Security Pacts” being used (figure 15). Once more, the exception is to be found on the Islands: the *quality of life* index is the same as in the South,⁴¹ but the number of “Pacts” signed is much higher (with values similar to Central Italy).

Figure 15. Percentage of municipalities with “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) and *general/quality of life* index by region/constituency

³⁹ This particular measure seems to be the most suitable to understand the *quality of life* and the levels of *economic development* in a specific area, compared to the GDP value that focuses too much on the economic wealth produced.

⁴⁰ The vertical and horizontal line in the figure corresponds to the average values (see figure 15).

⁴¹ This is due to the fact that Italia Oggi (2007) does not make any distinction between the South and the Islands, including both in the same category.



Source: Own processing of data extracted from Italia Oggi (2007). Demographic data source: ISTAT. Image: SPSS.

4. Conclusion

“Security Pacts” are negotiating innovative instruments aiming at governing security, which enjoyed a significant spread between 2007 to 2009 among Italian public administrations, that is, among municipalities, provinces and regions. The analysis conducted helped, in particular, to understand why “Pacts” acquired specific territorial configurations rather than others, drawing borders different from institutionally established administrative boundaries.

As observed, the hypothesis assuming the correlation between the territorial configurations of “Pacts” and the *political colour* of the contracting authorities and the central government, does not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation. The importance of the political and ideological cleavage, in particular, seems to be contradicted by the following

empirical findings: firstly, the “Pacts” were signed by both right-wing and left-wing governments and administrations; secondly, some “Pacts” were signed by administrations of a political affiliation and implemented, without substantial changes, by different administrations; thirdly, since their subscription, some “Pacts” ratified the collaboration between of local authorities at different territorial levels which were not (not all and not always) homogeneous in terms of affiliation.

The hypothesis that the population size and demographic density of the areas explain the spatial configuration of the instrument seems to explain some (not all, though) cases related to the “Pacts” signed in areas characterized by low levels of demographic density and the presence of small and very small-sized municipalities.

In this context, the third explanatory hypotheses gains more strength taking the social and economic conditions of the territory as the independent variable. Low urbanized areas characterized by high levels of widespread economic prosperity show a greater ability to make *bottom-up* security policies. The spatial configurations of “Pacts” suggest that those communities use the negotiation instruments proposed by the central government, as pre-emptive rather than reactive instruments, unlike high-density urban communities. Wealthier classes, in conclusion, seem to be able to organize defensive strategies by leveraging their capacity to organize themselves; starting from the pre-emptive protection of the territory, the environment, the economic activities and the living spaces in the form of prevention and pragmatic negotiation policies, able to overcome ideological barriers, both on the left-right axis, and the administrative, traditional boundaries of reference. While it is true that one of the declared objectives of the introduction of the instrument of “Security Pacts” in Italy was to encourage the production of the security good in terms of quality of life, we hereby claim that most of the administrations involved were those which already enjoyed the highest levels of quality of life. In a nutshell, the pactional instrument was mostly used to defend the *status quo*

(and promote the already *safe* areas), than to fill an existing gap (helping others to cope with security-related issues).

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