

Public/Private Competition and Collaboration for Non-Inherently-Governmental Work:

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"Competitive Sourcing"/(Public/Private Competition via OMB Circular A-76)

- ➡ Work that is not inherently governmental
- Allows for public sector to compete with private sector for work
- Also allows public and private sector to partner (as a competitive team)
- Benefits:
 - Government very often wins, but better performance at lower costs is realized, no matter who wins
 - Creates competition in environments that are not normally exposed to market forces
 - "Forcing factor" for "learning" with the existing process; and for improving the process



Concerns Expressed (by those opposed)

Performance will deteriorate.

- Industry will focus on profits, not public needs
- Industry won't be flexible to changing need (e.g. surges)
- Government more experienced in these jobs (so better)

Costs will be higher.

- Government employees are paid less
- And they don't charge a fee
- Promised Saving (from the competitions) will not be realized over time.
- ➡ Small Businesses will be negatively impacted.
- Large numbers of government employees will be involuntarily separated (RIFed).
- Loss of control by government management

Data Exist To Address Each Of These



Performance Improvements 1st – Then Cost Savings

- NAVAIR Auxiliary Power Unit, Logistics Support Program (a <u>public/private partnership</u>, utilizing COTS software) [*Caterpillar software*, *Honeywell management*]:
 - Reliability of each carrier-based aircraft's APU has been increased by more than a factor of ten.
 - Reliability exceeded guarantees by more than 25%.
 - Dramatic improvements achieved in mean-time-between-failures
 - 300% on P-3 Platform
 - 45% on FA-18A/B/C/D
 - 15-25% on S-3 and C-2 platforms
 - For Afghanistan, surged 50% to fill all demands
 - Program savings are difficult to quantify (since there is no baseline)

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Competitively-awarded Performance-Based Logistics--**Availability and Response Time Comparisons**

Material Availability*			Logistics Response Time**	
<u>Navy Program</u>	Pre-PBL	Post-PBL	Pre-PBL	Post-PBL
F-14 LANTIRN	73%	90%	56.9 Days	5 Days
H-60 Avionics	71%	85%	52.7 Days	8 Days
F/A-18 Stores Mgmt Syste	em 65%	98%	42.6 Days	2 Days CONUS 7 Days OCONUS
Tires	81%	98%	28.9 Days	2 Days CONUS 4 Days OCONUS
			35 Days ernment and "Post-PBL" is to a public/private partner;	
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*Klevan, Paul, NAVICP, UID Program Manager Workshop Briefing, 5 May 2005

**Kratz, Lou, OSD, Status Report, NDIA Logistics Conference Briefing, 2 Mar 2004 5

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Results of Earlier A-76 DoD Cost Comparisons: 1978 - 1994

	Competitions Completed	Average Annual Savings (\$M)	Percent Savings		
Army	510	\$470	27%		
Air Force	733	\$560	36%		
Marine Corps	39	\$23	34%		
Navy	806	\$411	30%		
Defense Agencies	50	\$13	28%		
Total	2,138	\$1,478	31%		

Defense Reform Initiative Report, Nov 1997



DoD "Competitive Sourcing" (A-76) Demonstrated Results 1994 – 2003***

Winning Bidder	Number of Competitions Won	Civilian Positions Competed (Excluding Direct Conversions)	MEO FTEs [*] (Excluding Direct Conversions)	% Decrease from Civilian Authorizations to Government MEO FTEs
In-House	525 (44%)	41,793	23,253	44%
Contractor	667 (56%)	23,364	16,848	28%**
Total	1,192	65,157	40,101	38%

*MEO= Most Efficient Organization (as proposed by government workers) **Even for the competitions won by the contractor, the MEOs proposed decreases of 28% in the FTE headcount

***Competitive Sourcing: What Happens to Federal Employees? Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, October 2004



Results from 2004 IRS Competitions*

	Number of FTEs Competed	Winner	FTEs Proposed	Reduction
Area Distribution Centers	400	MEO	160	60%
Campus Center Operations and Support	278	MEO	60	78%

The Government Employee MEO <u>Won Both</u> Competitions With Dramatic Proposed Savings


*The source selection results were released in Aug 2004



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CNA Study of Long-Run Costs of Competitive Sourcing



Weighted Averages	
Expected Savings (as bid by winner – government or private)	35%
Observed Savings (realized results, including scope & quantity changes)	24%
Effective Savings (realized results on same scope & quantity)	34%



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Impact on Small Business

- Between 1995 and 2001 DoD conducted 784 public-private competitions
 - 79% of all contracts awarded were to small businesses*
 - Additionally, many of the large contracts had requirements for a significant share to go to small businesses as sub-contracts.
- Navy-Marine Corps Intranet and NSA Intranet <u>mandate</u> 35% small business subcontracting
 - 10% must be used for Direct Labor Costs

Advertising Competitions on the World-Wide-Web Has Significantly Increased Small Business Participation. For example, NAVSEA's Seaport E-Business Portal Set a Goal of Assigning 35% of Subcontracted Work to Small Businesses. Also, Seven of Their 20 Multiple Award Contract (MAC) Holders Were Small Businesses.**

*Michael Wynne testimony, 13 Mar 02

^{**}David C. Weld, SeaPort: Charting a New Course for Professional Services Acquisition for America's Navy, IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, June 2003



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Effects on Employees

- CNA Study*
 - DoD programs found to be very effective in minimizing involuntary job losses
 - 40% of employees targeted for "Reduction In Force (RIFs)" from depot maintenance facilities found other DoD or federal jobs; many others hired by winning contractor; and others chose to retire
 - Only 3.4% were actually RIFed
- Department of Interior**
 - Smart planning allowed for 475 positions to be competed without anyone losing their job

*CNA Report CAB 96-62, Case Studies in DoD Outsourcing, Jan 1997 **Government Executive, March 31, 2003


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Loss of Control

"The **greatest impediment** to privatization by contracting is the **fear of loss of control** [by government managers]."*

In reality, the senior government managers <u>now</u> <u>have far greater control</u>

 They can use the <u>competitive</u> market to reward or replace, based on measured performance and costs (vs. their lack of control - - or visibility - - in the presence of a government monopoly)

But, the Government Has the Full Responsibility to Manage the Contract and the Contractor (Or They Will Lose Control)

*Based on the multiple surveys at the state and local level (F.S. Savas, Privatization and Public Private Partnerships, Chatham House, 2000, p. 285)



Old Perceptions Still Persist

- Performance will deteriorate
- Using government employees will cost less
- Promised cost savings (from the competition) won't be realized over time
- Small businesses will be negatively impacted
- Large numbers of government employees will be involuntarily separated (RIFed)
- Loss of control by government management

The Empirical Data Refute All Six of These Perceptions





<u>Results</u> Show that, <u>No Matter Who Wins</u> the <u>Competition</u>, <u>Performance has Improved</u> and <u>The</u> <u>Cost Savings Average at Least 30%</u>