Tim Reeskens

Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Tilburg University
Department of Sociology
P.O. Box 90153
NL – 5000 LE Tilburg
t.reeskens@uvt.nl

Ethnic-Cultural Diversity, Migrant Integration Policies and Social Cohesion in Europe

Investigating the Conditional Effect of Ethnic-Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust

Abstract

Due to an increasing influx of immigrants, European societies have become more ethnically and culturally diverse during the last decades. Recent research outcomes have demonstrated that indicators of social capital are slightly lower in those mixed European societies. The point of departure in this paper is that regimes of migrant integration can make a difference in strengthening the social fabric of societies, those regimes that treat immigrants in a fair manner an on an equal basis compared with the native population are expected to have positive spill over effects for the general population. The analysis builds upon an multilevel regression analysis of the impact of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust under the condition of migrant integration policies, derived from the Migrant Integration Policies Index. The results of this paper indicate, however that while trust is higher in countries with a palette of open policies, open regimes are nevertheless unable to mitigate the negative effect of diversity on trust.

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> La République, c'est la promotion sociale fondée sur le mérite et le talent. L'égalitarisme, c'est donner la même chose à tout le monde. La République tire tout le monde vers le haut. L'égalitarisme, c'est le nivellement par le bas. Qui ne voit que notre modèle d'intégration ne fonctionne plus? Au lieu de produire de l'égalité, il produit de l'inégalité. Au lieu de produire de la cohésion, il produit du ressentiment (Sarkozy, 22.06.2009).

1. Introduction

The social consequences of the increasing ethnic-cultural diversity of industrialized societies, and more specific the recent upsurge in immigrant influx to European societies (Hooghe et al, 2008), are of growing interest in the social sciences. This debate on the reconcilability between societal complexity and social cohesion has recently been accelerated by Robert Putnam's seminal study (2007) on the impact of the racial composition of US neighborhoods on social capital in which he discovered that residents in mixed census tracts exhibit considerably lower levels of involvement in public life. Also in Europe, this debate has set foot on academic ground (Hooghe et al, 2009; Letki, 2008; Tolsma et al, 2009). While there are within-country differences with regard to the impact of ethnic-cultural diversity on indicators of social capital, e.g. while in the UK a significant negative correlation has been discovered (Letki, 2008), Dutch results point to a null effect (Tolsma et al, 2009), the general trend indicates that the social fabric of European societies is only weakly eroded due to ethnic-cultural diversity and immigration (Hooghe et al, 2009; Gesthuizen et al, 2009), in contrast with the dominant US-findings.

While ethnic-cultural diversity and social cohesion are not necessarily irreconcilable across Europe, policy makers might nevertheless be interested in ways to strengthen the social fabric of diversity societies. In this respect, it needs to be remembered that across the industrialized societies, national governments have adopted a wide range of policies aiming at the integration of the newcomers into their host society (Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1999; Favell, 2001). And indeed, studies have already demonstrated that integration policies have an impact on the incorporation of immigrants into society (Fennema & Tillie, 2004). Nevertheless, it can be expected that migrant integration policies, even though they are not targeted to the native population, have effects that spill over onto wider society (Weldon, 2006). The main aim of this paper is therefore to investigate whether certain regimes of migrant integration policies are better able than others to reconcile ethnic-cultural diversity with social cohesion.

From a social capital perspective it is indeed expected that national institutions are highly relevant for the generation of civic skills, like there are associational involvement, generalized trust and tolerance (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). To be more precise, especially those welfare institutions that emphasize equality among all citizens and are impartially responsive towards its residents have demonstrated to contribute to individual levels of generalized trust, i.e. one of the most essential elements

of the social capital concept. Framing this argument on regimes of migrant integration, it can be expected that those regimes that grant immigrants the same rights compared with the native population, as well as those regimes that treat foreigners and natives equally are better able to craft trust among the general population.

To provide an appropriate answer to the question whether migrant integration regimes are able to strengthen the social fabric of diverse societies, I will first of all review the existing literature in the second section of this paper. On the one hand, the empirical outcomes regarding the social impact of ethnic-cultural diversity are discussed. On the other hand, the expected relation between migrant integration policies and social capital is grounded in existing research outcomes. In the third section, the data and methods that will be used in the empirical analysis are introduced. In the fourth section of this paper the empirical results are given. In the first part, departing from an existing data set of migrant integration policies in Europe, I will construct a typology of open vs restrictive regimes of migrant integration. In the second part, building upon the results of this clustering, I will answer the question whether open or restrictive regimes are better able to craft trust in diverse societies. The paper will be concluded with a critical reflection on the empirical outcomes and its implications.

2. Literature Review

During the last few years, the research into the impact of ethnic-cultural diversity on community life has been widely explored steadily. In the first stage of the theoretical review, I will summarize the research outcomes thus far and will demonstrate that the national context is of utmost in the understanding of the relation between diversity and social cohesion. Due to the importance of the national context, the second step in this theoretical section is to provide insights into how regimes of migrant integration can condition the relation between diversity and social cohesion.

2.1. Reviewing the Diversity-Social Cohesion Literature

Even though the question whether social cohesion is under pressure due to societal complexity is at the core of social science discipline, only recently empirical outcomes regarding the ethnic-cultural composition of community and the influx of immigrants on social and political attitudes and behavior have been presented. More specifically, the debate has been pushed forward by the publication of Putnam's seminal research on the relation between census tract heterogeneity and social capital of its residents (2007). Putnam's outcomes have confirmed earlier studies documenting a negative of ethnic-cultural diversity on indicators of social capital in the US (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Costa & Kahn, 2003; Hero, 2003). Reviewing dominant theories on race relations, namely group threat theories and intergroup contact, Putnam argues that both models

need to be rejected and that instead, anomie theory is more capable in explaining the influence of diversity on Americans: "Diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us" (Putnam, 2007, p. 157). Thus, living in diverse neighborhoods does not only decrease solidarity with other ethnic groups, he argues, also solidarity with members of the in-group is under pressure in these mixed census tracts.

The finding of a significant negative relation between contextual diversity and indicators measuring the health of American communities has urged other social scientists to replicate Putnam's findings in different contexts. While published within-country studies in Europe remain rather scarce, evidence has led to diverging voices. In the United Kingdom, the negative relation between diversity and social capital has only partially been confirmed (Letki, 2008): diversity has a dampening effect on trust but not on interactions in the neighborhood (see also Laurence & Heath, 2008; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008). Dutch analyses have refuted the Putnam thesis, arguing that under control of relevant covariates, the ethnic-cultural composition of neighborhoods does not drive down social cohesion (Tolsma, van der Meer & Gesthuizen, 2009). Preliminary analyses in Germany, Spain and Flanders (Belgium) have also not arrived at uniform results: while the Putnam-thesis of a negative relation has been diagnosed in Germany (Gundelach & Traunmüller, 2009), the recent upsurge in immigrant inflow to Spain has not led to an erosion of its community life (Morales & Echazarra, 2009), nor does the ethnic-cultural composition of Flemish municipalities exert a negative impact on the levels of trust and associational involvement of its residents (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2009).

The diverging results across Europe are exemplified in a number of cross-national studies. Using the 2004 wave of the Eurobarometer, Gesthuizen and colleagues (2009) have demonstrated that immigration can hardly be held accountable for differences in stocks of social capital across European countries. In an additional study, Hooghe and colleagues (2009) have, using the European Social Survey, focused on geographical differentials in generalized trust, i.e. the cultural component of the social capital concept, and discovered that ethnic-cultural diversity, made operational by a wide range of variables, has only a weak negative impact. Despite the absence of consistent and significant negative effects of ethnic-cultural diversity on generalized trust, both manuscripts confirmed that trust in the generalized other is highly dependent upon the national context, i.e. that the national institutions create those conditions in which trust is able to flourish. Thus, related to the contemporary debate on ethnic-cultural diversity and immigrant influx, while diversity has only a weak dampening effect on the creation of generalized trust, it might in the end be possible that those regimes that aim at integrating immigrants into the host society are in fact able to craft generalized trust among the general population and might strengthen the social fabric of diverse societies.

2.2. How Migrant Integration Policies Might Craft Generalized Trust

The idea that policies are able to generate trust follows on the outcomes that scholars of the welfare state have shown recently in relation with the generalized trust component of social capital (Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). Now a decade ago, Uslaner formulated that the best inducer for trust is equality (Uslaner, 2002), for which it has been shown that it leads to more optimism and creates a shared sense of togetherness, which are both essential for the creation of trust. With regard to policies, the general assumption is that a certain set of policies represents the egalitarian nature of certain national governments. To frame it on Nannestad's review paper on generalized trust (2008) an open set of migrant integration policies may reflect the egalitarian norms that are carried out by the political system. In this respect, the theoretical framework on the relation between migrant integration policies and generalized trust can partially fall back on the new-institution centered approach to generalized trust as has been introduced recently (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005) and therefore contrasts the idea that trust is rooted in socialization and everyday experience (Putnam, 1993; Offe, 1999; Hardin, 2002), leading to macro-level outcomes (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995).

More specifically, the neo-institution centered scholars argue that those regimes that are impartially and equally oriented towards citizens, i.e. universal welfare programs, are in fact able to craft trust in the generalized other (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Rothstein, 2005; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). Compared with these universal policies, selective policies are highly conditioned: only after an individual needs test taking certain criteria into account, citizens can have access to certain allowances. In contrast, universal policies do not depend upon an exhaustive list of limitations to be granted access to benefits. Rather, these policies target everybody in society, for instance, the poor as well the rich, without making distinctions based on income levels or other criteria. Health care is a very clear example, since this service is in most industrialized countries, universally designed and not dependent upon strict criteria. Yet, in the US for instance, health care is not universal, yet, a better treatment condition may depend upon a better insurance program, which in most of the cases will reflect one's socioeconomic position. As such, universal regimes represent a completely different logic compared with selective policies, exemplified by the statement "the question becomes not 'how shall we solve their problem?' but rather 'how shall we solve our common problem (healthcare, education, pensions, etc.)?'" (Rothstein, 1998, p. 160). This expression underscores the egalitarian character that is inherent in universal policies.

In fact, these universal welfare institutions have shown to be able to grasp trust among the general population. The mechanisms behind this effect are twofold (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). The first mechanism is impartiality, which means that the needs-testing procedures that are inherent in the selective procedures must be unambiguous. Taking many applications into consideration, ambiguity in these needs-testing procedures makes that there is a certain degree of

discretion involved. Since those who apply for benefits are in need to have access to this benefit, they might provide the agency of interest with wrongful information about their situation. Contrary, those agencies providing the benefits need to judge upon these criteria and may be aware that certain requests may be packed in lies. The result is a general distrust from both sides. The second mechanism regards that these universal institutions aim to treat citizens in the same respect. Instead of giving assistance after a thorough means-investigation, to give an example in the light of the welfare state research, those policies aim at providing help for those in need regardless of a thorough investigation. Since equality is known to be essential in the creation of trust (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2007), it is also the case that these universal welfare policies, which exemplify equality among citizens, are best able to grasp generalized trust among the residents. This overview has also shown that impartiality and equality are not always highly related: while institutions may be means-tested, they may do so in an impartial manner. Coming back to health care, selective health care might be impartial since it investigates private insurances of every citizen in the same respect; yet, by providing different services according to the insurance program, equality is not emphasized. Thus, at best, those regimes that combine both should result in the generation of generalized trust.

Similarly, the same kind of logic regarding the impartiality of universal welfare regimes can also be applied to policies of migrant integration. First of all, open policies might be more able to enhance the equality among all residents on the soil compared with restrictive policies; these policies give equal rights to the immigrants as to native residents. From an equality point of view, the social distance between the two groups is reduced, which is beneficial for the creation of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002; Rohmann et al., 2006). The example of a policy measure that tends to reduce the social distances between natives and immigrants is for instance language courses. Not speaking the dominant language can be an impediment that still tends to draw lines among groups. Second, those open migrant integration policies reflect political institutions that show an "equal concern and respect" (Dworkin, 1977, p. 180, in Rothstein, 1998, p. 32). In practice, granting voting rights is an example of such a policy, since they provide migrant groups the instrument to voice their grievances to those who can address them. From an institution-centered approach, this equal concern and respect translates into individual pro-social behavior and attitudes since the equal grounding of these policies 'teach' individual citizens the norms of equality.

To sum up, derived from the literature on welfare state regimes, it can thus be expected that in countries that are characterized by a regime of open migrant integration policies, considerable higher levels of generalized trust will be recorded. Those regimes show an inclusive orientation towards newcomers and by emphasizing the equal treatment between migrants and newcomers, the regimes emphasize that the new members are part of the community, which is expected to foster trust. It can therefore also be expected

that those open regimes might be able to mitigate the weak negative effect of diversity on trust, of which it can be expected that restrictive regimes cannot.

3. Data and Methods

To qualify the interaction between ethnic-cultural diversity and migrant integration policies on generalized trust, three distinct data sources will be used. With regard to the dependent variable of interest, namely generalized trust, data from the 2006 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) is used. By using the ESS, this paper follows Hooghe et al (2009). At present, the ESS is recognized as one of the leading social survey questioning several attitudes and behavior in more than 20 European countries.[1] Generalized trust is in the ESS questioned by three indicators tapping the attitude whether people in general can be trusted, are helpful and treat each other in a fair manner. What is more important is that these three indicators have demonstrated to be equivalently measured across European countries (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008), meaning that the same latent trust-concept is present across the countries of the ESS, implying that cross-national investigations regarding this concept are allowed.

In contrast with previous studies that frame regimes of migrant integration policies on rather heuristic interpretations of citizenship regimes (Weldon, 2006), the classification of the regimes of migrant integration will be based on an empirical evaluation of the validity of country clusters. To cluster the countries in more or less homogeneous groups, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; Niessen & Huddleston, 2009) will be explored in the first part of the empirical section. The MIPEX consists out of 140 policy indicators for 27 European countries[2] plus Canada. The MIPEX data are gathered by means of blind expert surveys: two independent experts were consulted to qualify the national policies on all 140 policies initiatives. The 140 indicators are split up in six main

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[1] The countries that have participated in ESS2006 are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria, Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Russia, Spain (ES), Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom (GB). Also Romania and Latvia have participated but because of the absence of design weights, these countries have not been taken up. Since Switzerland has a high leverage value with regard to ethnic-cultural diversity, which is the independent variable of interest, on generalized trust, this country is also left out of the analysis. Three additional countries are left out of the analysis since they are not taken up in the Migrant Integration Policies Index, namely Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine. The 19 countries that will be present in the analysis of this paper have their associated country code between parentheses.

[2] These 27 countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

strands, namely labor market access, family reunion, long term residence, political participation, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination initiatives.

The Migrant Policy Group (Niessen et al, 2007) has, next to the individual scores on all 140 indicators, provided us with aggregated scores, varying from 0 to 100, on the pooled indicators as well as on the six strands, these aggregated scores. However, the disadvantage of these composite scores is that they do not tell us which countries are rather homogeneous in their set of policies. It is known that cluster analysis is able to distinguish between groups of countries that have adapted a more or less homogeneous palette of policies. The disadvantage, however is that by distinguishing open from restrictive policies, variation within the clusters is not regarded. Nevertheless, by modeling clusters of similar sets of countries, the boundaries between open and restrictive policies are better pronounced compared with a 0-100 interval score. The clustering method is based on the Ward-estimator, which is, among all available techniques, considered as providing highly reliable outcomes (Sharma, 1995). Moreover, the clustering will be executed on only 111 indicators since for 29 variables missing information is present.

It needs to be emphasized that the coding (namely ordinal from 1 to 3) of the MIPEX resembles the extent to which these countries meet the EU Directives regarding integration policies, with a code of 1 meaning the most unfavorable initiative and a code of 3 the best practice in the field. To give but one example regarding the coding of language courses in the set of migrant regimes, if countries refrain from impose these courses, countries are coded as meeting the EU Directives while from the perspective of generalized trust, it might be expected that language initiatives reduce the cultural distance between immigrants and the natives. Nevertheless, since these country clusters form a homogeneous set of policies, it can be expected that these specific indicators are exemplary for the general egalitarian character of a nation-state. Thus, from this perspective, this approach towards the clustering, based on policy-coded variables, is appropriate.

Table 1. Distribution of Variables of Interest

Country	Generalized Trust (0-10) (std dev)	Share of Immigrants (UN)	MIPEX Score (0-100)
Sweden	6.311 (1.572)	12.4	88
Portugal	4.274 (1.879)	7.3	79
Belgium	5.121 (3.648)	6.9	69
Netherlands	5.773 (1.513)	10.1	68
Finland	6.435 (1.481)	3.0	67
Italy	Not in ESS2006		65
Norway	6.641 (1.462)	7.4	64
United Kingdom	5.600 (1.622)	9.1	63
Spain	4.980 (1.495)	11.1	61
Slovenia	4.501 (2.014)	8.5	55
France	4.924 (1.636)	10.7	55
Luxembourg	Not in ESS2006		55
Germany	5.175 (1.720)	12.3	53
Switzerland	Leverage value on ethnic-cultural diversity		53
Ireland	5.712 (1.868)	14.1	50
Hungary	4.465 (2.118)	3.1	48
Czech Republic	Not in ESS2006		48
Estonia	5.170 (1.940)	15.2	46
Lithuania	Not in ESS2006		45
Poland	4.133 (1.834)	1.8	44
Denmark	6.836 (1.564)	7.2	44
Malta	Not in ESS2006		41
Slovak Republic	4.370 (1.966)	2.3	40
Greece	Not in ESS2006		40
Austria	5.426 (1.945)	15.1	39
Cyprus	4.379 (1.908)	13.9	39
Latvia	Not in ESS2006		30

Note: Entries represent the aggregated score on generalized trust (data obtained from the 2006 wave of the European Social Survey), the share of immigrants (UN Population Statistics, 2008) and the score on Migrant Integration Policies Index (Niessen, Huddleston & Citron, 2007). Countries are sorted according to the MIPEX Score. The cluster analysis on migrant integration policies will be based on the whole 27 countries; the analysis of migrant integration policies on trust will be based on 19 countries.

To capture the level of ethnic-cultural diversity within the country, the UN data with regard to share of immigrants on the total population will be used. While the most state-of-the-art studies on the effect of diversity on social cohesion indicators have thus far explored this relation using the OECD statistics on Trends in International Migration

(Hooghe et al, 2009; Gesthuizen et al, 2009), it needs to be acknowledged that the commensurability between all varying data sets necessitates the use of a data file that goes beyond the OECD countries. Indeed, the use of the OECD data is discarded in this paper since the test of the interaction between diversity and minority policies requires as many countries as possible. In the 2006 wave of the ESS (for the measurement of generalized trust) and the MIPEX data file (for the migrant integration policies), more countries are available than are countries member of the OECD. From a methodological point of view, relying on the OECD data would limit the statistical power, which can alternatively be increased by relying on the UN Population Statistics for 2006 (2008). From a substantial point of view, however, incorporating additional European non-OECD countries in the analysis does also make sense in the light of the debate on the EU Directives on Migrant Incorporation. Therefore, since the Population Division of the United Nations has gathered the migrant stock size for almost all countries across the globe, this data source is used for ethnic-cultural diversity. To be complete, the correlation between this data source and the stocks of foreigners for the available OECD countries is about .90. In Table 1, all relevant data, namely the dependent generalized trust variable as well as ethnic-cultural diversity (the share of immigrants) and the migrant integration policies are summarized.

In order to estimate the effect of diversity on generalized trust under the condition of contextual diversity, multilevel multiple regression will be used. Applying this strategy, the paper follows the recent analytical strategy of modeling contextual covariates, i.e. ethnic-cultural diversity and migrant integration policy regimes, on individual level outcomes, i.e. generalized trust, controlling for other individual and national factors. It needs to be emphasized that multilevel modeling is required since the ESS is a so-called nested data structure, i.e. respondents are clustered within countries, which would otherwise violate the OLS regression assumption of independent observations (respondents in countries are expected to share certain characteristics with regard to the outcome variable of interest), which would bias the standard errors (Hox, 2002; Gelman & Hill, 2006). Central in this paper is the interaction between regimes of migrant integration and ethnic-cultural diversity. According to the methodological guidelines, the interaction term between diversity and integration regimes is supplemented next to its main effects (Brambor & Clark, 2006).

The advantage of multilevel regression analysis is that the effect of diversity on trust under the condition of varying regimes of migrant integration can be controlled for relevant individual and national level covariates. As the literature has already demonstrated, trust is an individual asset that is highly dependent upon socialization and everyday experiences as well as the context individuals live in. For this reason, a set of individual covariates that has previously demonstrated to be relevant in the generation of trust will be included (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002; Hooghe et al, 2009), namely age, gender, foreign descent, level of urbanization, family situation (i.e. civil status and having children), socioeconomic status (years of education, employment

status, and financial satisfaction), and leisure time (volunteering, religious attendance and watching television). With regard to the national level control variables, research has shown that trust is highly dependent upon national prosperity (GDP per capita) and upon having a Protestant tradition (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007).[3]

4. Results

The analysis of the cushioning impact of diversity on trust under the condition of regimes of migrant integration thus requires two steps. First of all, it is necessary to classify countries on the basis on a more or less homogeneous set of policies. In the second step, the retained clusters of migrant integration regimes will be brought in relation with generalized trust, controlled for other relevant covariates.

4.1. Clustering Open and Restrictive Regimes

The first step of the analysis is thus to determine which countries can be grouped together as open vs restrictive regimes because they have enacted a more or less homogeneous palette of migrant integration policies. The cluster analysis, using Ward as estimation method, on the pooled data covering 111 indicators provides the following results. The discrimination between the countries points out that two main clusters of about equal size have emerged, as can seen in Figure 1. One indeed can argue whether the second cluster in the right hand side of the cluster solution in Figure 1 is composed out of a subcluster. However, since at first glance it is difficult to label these clusters, I will hold on to only two for the reasons of parsimony and clarity.[4] One cluster, in the right side of the figure, is easy to classify and contains predominantly Scandinavian and Western European countries, including a small number of Southern European countries. What is quite important to note is that in this cluster already shows some deviances from the composite MIPEX-score. More specifically, United Kingdom and Ireland form a subcluster together with Belgium, Portugal and Sweden; however, they are somewhat above the average MIPEX-score. The most appropriate label for this cluster is 'open policies'.

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[3] To be complete, the country level control variables have been selected after a profound analysis of a number of country level covariates that have previously shown to be relevant (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007). The output of this analysis is available upon request.

[4] France and the Netherlands do, for instance, belong to the same cluster while, according to the ideal typical models, Netherlands is considered as multicultural while France is considered as universalist (Koopmans, 2005).

The second cluster, in the left hand side of Figure 1, contains most Eastern European countries, including Austria. Next to the Eastern countries, also most of the Southern European countries, with the exception of Spain, and Luxembourg and Denmark are included in this cluster. It is quite interesting to regard what some of the minor subclusters are composed of. While Italy and Slovenia are quite homogeneous, which seems evident since they are neighboring, other subclusters require more attention, for instance the subcluster Greece and Slovakia or Estonia and Malta, indicating that these countries have implemented a homogeneous set of policies. This second cluster can be labeled as 'restrictive policies'.

Figure 1. Cluster Analysis on the Pooled MIPEX Data Set



Note: The graph depicts the results of a cluster analysis with ward-estimation method on 111 MIPEX indicators. Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MA), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (GB).

The analysis on the full migrant integration policies data set has shown interesting patterns. First, using cluster analysis provides us with a different kind of information compared with an investigation of the country specific aggregated MIPEX score. For instance, while Sweden and Portugal are, just like on the overall MIPEX variable, clustering together, the fact that Finland and Germany are grouped is different compared with the overall MIPEX ranking. A similar kind of reasoning can be applied to other country clusters. Second, the analysis seems to provide evidence for a major East-West distinction with regard to migrant integration policies, as is present in the literature on regimes of migrant integration (Kohn, 1944; Brubaker, 1992). Despite noteworthy

countries, which provide substantial information in its own respect, the open policies cluster has been formed around the Western European countries while the restrictive policies cluster encapsulate all former Soviet countries. Third, in contrast with previous comment, applying Brubaker's framework to this model, it seems far from evident that France and Germany are ideal types for the respectively the Western and Eastern concepts of migrant integration regimes. The analysis has revealed that Germany and France are grouped into the same minor cluster that is part of open regimes. Fourth, relating to European geography, while the analysis has provided evidence for a East-West divide, the country clusters do not collapse with the North-South divide which is widely discussed in comparative politics (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 1990). For instance, while Finland and Norway fit into one subcluster, the absence of Sweden and predominantly Denmark makes it hard to label certain migrant policies as Nordic; moreover, the variation among Southern European countries – on the one hand, Portugal is in the same cluster the Nordic countries while Spain groups together with most Western countries while on the other hand, Greece and Cyprus can be traced back to the Eastern European clusters of countries. Fifth, the cluster analysis raises questions about processes of policy learning. To what extent might countries adopt policies from their neighboring countries? Even though clear examples of this issue are present, for instance Greece-Cyprus and Italy-Slovenia, the majority of the results, like for instance the subcluster of Sweden and Portugal indicate that it is hard to sustain that neighboring countries adopt policies from each other.

Table 2. Cluster Analysis of the Migrant Integration Policies Subdomains

Policy domain	Restrictive policies	Open policies
Labor market access	AT, HU, CZ, SK, GR, LU, MA, PL, CY, DE, DK, LV, LT	BE, SI, GB, FI, NO, IE, EE, NL, IT, PT, ES, SE, CH, FR
Family reunification	AT, CH, DK, LV, CY, GR, GB, FR, NL, NO	BE, SE, CZ, EE, SI, MA, LT, PL, FI, DE, IT, PT, ES, HU, SK, IE, LU
Long-term residence	CY, LV, LT, LU, IE	AT, GR, DE, NO, FR, BE, ES, DK, GB, CZ, PL, PT, FI, SI, CH, EE, MA, IT, NL, SK, HU
Political participation	CZ, EE, LV, SI, LT, SK, CY, GR, PL, MA, HU, DK, IE	AT, FR, IT, DE, BE, LU, ES, CH, FI, NL, NO, SE, PT, GB
Access to nationality	AT, IT, SI, MA, SK, ES, PL, NL, CZ, CY, FI, DK, EE, NO, DE, HU, CH, FR, GR, LV, LT, LU	BE, GB, IE, SE, PT
Anti-discrimination	AT, MA, SK, GR, LU, NO, CZ, ES, CY, DE, IE, LT, DK, LV, EE, CH, PL	BE, IT, NL, FI, FR, SI, GB, HU, PT, SE

Note: Results of cluster analysis (Ward estimator) on the six subdomains of migrant integration policies (MIPEX). Source: Niessen, et al (2007) and own calculations. The open vs. restrictive reference has been based on the position of Sweden. For country labels, check Figure 1.

Looking at the six individual policy domains, I have split the results up to the categories of restrictive versus open policies. The point of departure to classify countries in this manner was the position of Sweden, which was at the top of all migrant integration policies scores and therefore meets the EU Directives in the best manner. The results seem to be more or less in line with the overall MIPEX-clusters. However, two policy domains are worth discussing. First of all, with regard to long-term residence, about five countries are quite homogeneous and restrictive in such a manner that they deviate from other, more open policies. While I have stressed that predominantly the Eastern European countries adopt restrictive policies, it needs to be stressed that for long-term residence, Luxembourg and Ireland have adopted quite similar policies as Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania. With regard to access to nationality, on the other hand, only a small number of countries have adopted a set of homogeneous open policies, namely Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden and Portugal. All the other countries form a distinct cluster that can be labeled as restrictive.

Critics may also argue that the distinction between open and restrictive policies is too crude and within-cluster variation may be lacking. Similar criticism has been raised against Esping-Andersen typology of welfare state regimes (1990). However, Esping-Andersen defended his approach by arguing that "the peculiarities of these cases are variations within a distinct overall logic, not a wholly different logic per se" (1999, p. 90). Indeed, while the clusters of open vs. restrictive countries represent a set of policies that are heterogeneous between but homogeneous within the clusters. While it is not the aim to minimize the within-cluster heterogeneity, the two clusters as they are represented provide us with a convincing framework to which the hypotheses that have been derived from the theoretical arguments regarding the social impact of diversity conditioned by regimes of migrant integration can be tested.

4.2. Estimating the Social Impact of Regimes of Migrant Integration

In order to estimate the unique effect of ethnic-cultural diversity under the condition of regimes of migrant integration policies, it is necessary to control for other factors, both at the individual and national level, that are able to explain differentials in generalized trust. The analysis of the variance components of generalized trust shows that the intra class correlation is 0.179 meaning that roughly 20 percent of the variability in individual levels of generalized trust can be attributed to the country level.[5] In Table 2, the baseline model is presented to which the policy information will be modeled against. In Model I, all individual level covariates are presented while in Model II, the national level information is added to Model I.

[5] The country level covariance is 0.668 while the individual level covariance is 3.061. The intra class correlation is calculated as follows: 0.668 / (0.668 + 3.061).

Table 2. Multilevel Regression Result for Generalized Trust

	Model I: Level I		Model II: Model I + Level II	
Fixed Effects	**Param**	**T-Value**	**Param**	**T-Value**
Intercept	3.866***	22.07	2.367***	8.95
Age	0.006***	5.93	0.006***	5.92
Female (ref: male)	0.127***	6.47	0.127***	6.48
Foreign descent (ref: native)	-0.129***	-4.68	-0.129***	-4.68
Level of urbanization	-0.035***	-4.30	-0.035***	-4.29
Civil status:				
- Divorced / separated	-0.122***	-3.42	-0.122***	-3.42
- Partner died	0.037	0.92	0.037	0.92
- Single / no legal union (ref: living together)	0.105***	3.43	0.105***	3.43
Children (ref: without)	-0.023	-1.01	-0.023	-1.00
Years of education	0.044***	16.52	0.044***	16.49
Employment status:				
- Unemployed	-0.119*	-2.48	-0.120*	-2.49
- Student	0.252***	6.33	0.252***	6.32
- Retired	0.011	0.31	0.011	0.31
- Other (ref: employed)	-0.047	-1.53	-0.048	-1.54
Financial satisfaction	0.303***	22.68	0.303***	22.65
Volunteering	0.198***	9.71	0.197***	9.66
Religious attendance	0.066***	9.48	0.066***	9.51
Television watching	0.058**	2.89	0.058**	2.89
Quadratic TV watching	-0.008***	-3.35	-0.008***	-3.36
GDP per capita			0.047***	5.24
Protestant tradition			0.807***	5.20
Share of immigrants			-0.021	-1.19
Random effects	**Param**	**Z-Value**	**Param**	**Z-Value**
Individual level variance	2.894***	129.52	2.860***	132.90
Country level variance	0.506**	3.07	0.091**	3.03
Intra-class correlation	14.88%		3.47%	
N	33,569		33,569	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

The results in Model I of Table 2 confirm the outcomes that have been discovered thus far (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002; Hooghe et al, 2009). Age is positively related to trust, meaning that the elderly have, on average, more trust in the

generalized other, just as women are more trusting than men. Since residents of foreign descent are faced with disadvantages, it is no surprise that also across Europe, they report lower levels of trust. Also the level of urbanization of the area one lives in decreases one's trust levels. With regard to civil status, the regression results indicate that those who are divorced or did separate from their partner have significant lower levels of trust compared with those in a legal partnership while singles or those that are not in a legal union have significantly higher levels of trust. Having children does, contrary with American research outcomes, not increase individual levels of trust. On the other hand, the socioeconomic position is highly relevant for the generation of trust: having enjoyed a prolonged education, being employed as well as being satisfied with one's financial resources are positively related to trust. In line with the Putnam-tradition (1993; 2000), being involved in voluntary organizations is also positively related to trust, as well as attending religious services frequently. In contrast with the American outcomes, television watching shows a curvilinear effect on trust: the most distrusting Europeans are those that never tune in as well as those that are heavy watchers.

Turning then to Model II in Table 2, in which the country level covariates at level II are added to the individual level covariates of Model I, the outcomes confirm the Inglehart thesis (1997), namely that postmaterial attitudes, like trusting the generalized other, is highly dependent upon the economic situation as well as the cultural tradition. More specifically, trust is significantly higher in first of all those countries that have high levels of GDP per capita. Secondly, in line with what Delhey and Newton (2005) have labeled 'Nordic exceptionalism', having had a Protestant tradition is still reflected in individual level trust levels, i.e. residents of countries with a Protestant tradition have, holding everything constant, higher trust levels. In line with the latest results on ethnic-cultural diversity and generalized trust in Europe, we can observe a negative parameter estimate of the share of immigrants on generalized trust; nevertheless, since this effect is not significant, it can be concluded that the dampening effect of immigration on the social fabric of society is rather weak.

For the remainder of the analyses, the baseline model, as is presented in Model II of Table 2, is supplemented with the effect of regimes of migrant integration (which will be based on the outcome of the cluster analysis in previous section) as well as the interaction with ethnic-cultural diversity (the UN figure regarding the share of immigrants on the total population). With regard to the regimes of migrant integration, the countries have been categorized as having restrictive (code 0) or open (code 1) policies.

Table 3. Multilevel Multiple Regression Model for the Interaction Between Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Migrant Integration Policy (Clustering Based on Pooled Data Set) on Generalized Trust

	Without interaction		With interaction	
	Param	**T-Value**	**Param**	**T-Value**
Share of immigrants	-0.022	-1.25	-0.016	-0.77
Pooled MIPEX	-0.102	-0.59	0.062	0.16
Share of immigrants * Pooled MIPEX			-0.017	-0.46

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. The variables are controlled for all other covariates as in Model II in Table 2.

Table 3 summarizes the relevant variables of the multilevel multiple regression model for explaining generalized trust with diversity and the cluster outcome based on the pooled Migrant Integration Policy Index, and whether certain policies might mitigate the negative effects of diversity on generalized trust. As the model without the interaction terms shows, in line with Model II of Table 2, diversity affects generalized trust in a weak negative manner. However, there is a slight negative trend for migrant policies: countries that have adapted open policies with regard to their migrant integration have, on average, slightly lower trust levels among the citizenry. When adding the interaction effect, the interpretation changes: one can notice a negative main effect of diversity, a positive main effect of regimes of migrant integration policies and a negative interaction term. Thus, while diversity is still under pressure in diverse societies and regimes of migrant integration have a weak but positive impact on generalized trust, the negative interaction term denotes that open regimes are not able to mitigate the negative effect of diversity on generalized trust.

Figure 2 has plotted the interaction between diversity and restrictive versus open regimes on generalized trust. The graph shows that trust is in general slightly higher in countries with open policies. Yet, what once again is quite remarkable is the heteroscedasticity for both the open and restrictive countries – the explained variance (R2) at the aggregate level does not exceed 10 percent, which is low. To start with, the cluster of France, Spain and Germany almost collapse with the trend line for the relation of diversity on trust for unrestrictive countries; however, the three mentioned countries are all countries that have adopted policies that can be labeled as open. Second, in line with the analysis of civic and ethnic citizenship requirements, the clear outliers in the data may be as well highly informative. On the one hand, Portugal combines quite open migrant policies with an average level of heterogeneity while it has about the lowest trust levels among its citizenry. On the other hand, Denmark has similar levels of immigrants on its territory but is characterized by restrictive policies while it has among the highest levels of trust.

Figure 1. Interaction Between Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and Ethnic-Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust



R2 for restrictive policy: 9.03%; R2 for open policy: 2.70%

Note: The plots represent the aggregated relation between diversity and trust under control of the country clustering on the basis of the pooled MIPEX-data. In the model, these variables are controlled for all other covariates as in Model II in Table 2. For country labels, check Figure 1.

When disaggregating the migrant integration policies to the six domains that have been questioned, namely labor market access, family reunification, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination measures, one can see that in general, the same trend can be observed. Looking at the models without interaction, all models except family reunification and political participation show a positive but nonsignificant effect of the policies on generalized trust. Thus, countries that have adopted open policies regarding migrant integration rank on average slightly higher on generalized trust than countries with restrictive policies. Including the interaction between diversity and the policies, diversity consistently shows a negative but insignificant effect for the restrictive policies (since the main effect of the policies and the interactions are left out off the equation). For open policies, the main effect is, except for access to nationality, positive combined with, on average, a negative effect of the interaction. Thus, countries with open policies have higher levels of trust but trust still declines for more heterogeneous countries.

Table 1. Multilevel Multiple Regression Models for the Interaction Between Ethnic-Cultural Diversity and Migrant Integration Policies on Generalized Trust

		Without interaction		With interaction	
		Param	**T-Value**	**Param**	**T-Value**
Model 1	Diversity	-0.022	-1.22	-0.037	-1.56
	Labor market access	0.056	0.36	-0.282	-0.73
	Diversity * Labor market			0.035	0.95
Model 2	Diversity	-0.021	-1.19	-0.028	-0.56
	Family reunion	-0.013	-0.08	-0.106	-0.16
	Diversity * Family reunion			0.008	0.14
Model 3	Diversity	-0.018	-0.94	1.891	0.85
	Long-term residence	0.109	0.41	26.81	0.86
	Diversity * Long-term resid			-1.908	-0.86
Model 4	Diversity	-0.021	-1.21	-0.018	-0.82
	Political participation	-0.068	-0.42	0.010	0.02
	Diversity * Pol participation			-0.008	-0.21
Model 5	Diversity	-0.021	-1.19	-0.026	-1.43
	Access to nationality	0.002	0.01	-0.450	-0.86
	Diversity * Access nation'ty			0.046	0.91
Model 6	Diversity	-0.018	-1.01	-0.014	-0.67
	Anti-discrimination	0.085	0.59	0.239	0.67
	Diversity * Anti-discrimin			-0.018	-0.47

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. The variables are controlled for all other covariates as in Model II in Table 2.

Once again, plots have been printed for the clarification of these interaction models. The first remark regards the interaction effect for the long-term residence policies. As the clustering of the countries has revealed is that for long-term residence, most of the countries do cluster together as being open in this type of migrant integration policy. As a result, only two countries remain, which leads to the quite absurd plot and regression result (i.e. the main effect of long-term residence policies has a slope of more than 20). But for the other policy domains, most of the graphs look quite similar to the general MIPEX-trend, i.e. highly different trust-levels for homogeneous countries according to the policy that is in effect, and convergence in these generalized trust levels when countries are mixed.

Figure 2. Interaction Between Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and Ethnic-Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust

Model 1. Labor Market Access



R2 for restrictive policies: 9.90%
R2 for open policies: 1.74%

Model 2. Family Reunification



R2 for restrictive policies: 61.91%
R2 for open policies: 16.19%

Model 3. Long-Term Residence



R2 for restrictive policies: -
R2 for open policies: 4.82%

Model 4. Political Participation



R2 for restrictive policies: 10.96%
R2 for open policies: 4.57%

Model 5. Access to Nationality



R2 for restrictive policies: 0.17%
R2 for open policies: 53.89%

Model 6. Anti-Discrimination



R2 for restrictive policies: 2.24%
R2 for open policies: 3.22%

Note: The plots represent the aggregated relation between diversity and trust under control of the country clustering on the basis of the strand specific MIPEX-data. In the model, these variables are controlled for all other covariates as in Model II in Table 2. For country labels, check Figure 1.

Thus, while the plots give mixed results, the results of the multilevel test are rather straightforward: migrant integration policies, i.e. open policies, are positively associated with generalized trust, which is in line with the theory. However, contrary to what was expected, these policies hardly affect the negative effect of diversity on trust: diversity still has a negative effect on generalized trust, even taking the varying country policies into account.

5. Conclusion

This paper started with the positive orientation that regimes of migrant integration might be able to strengthen the social fabric of diverse societies. Coming at the end of this paper, the results point to both interesting and puzzling findings. Based on a multilevel multiple regression analysis on trust of a cluster solution of countries on the basis of the Migrant Integration Policies Index into restrictive and open policies regimes has demonstrated that on average, regimes which tend to be inclusive towards migrants – i.e. countries that have in general open migrant integration legislation – are associated with on average slightly higher levels of generalized trust. It has to be noted however that this effect is not significant according to classic significance test statistics, which can not only be explained by the fact that the effects may in general are expected to be this weak, but also to the limited number of countries that are involved in the study (cf. the Kreft 30/30 rule of thumb for doing multilevel analysis; Kreft, 1996; Meuleman & Billiet, 2009).

When including the interaction term between regimes of migrant integration policies and diversity on generalized trust, which responds to the question whether diverse countries with certain policies are better able to maintain trust, the results are, from a social engineering perspective, rather disappointing. For those countries with open policies, while trust levels my be slightly higher, nevertheless, trust declines when diversity increases. Thus taken together, the weak negative trend between diversity and trust that is present across Europe has not been mitigated by controlling for the presence of certain types of regimes of migrant integration.

The findings in this paper raise some additional questions with regard to policy implementations. More specifically, we should be skeptical about the causal arrow in this relation. Is it the case, as I assume implicitly by specifying the multilevel multiple regression model, that by granting certain rights the equality among all citizens is promoted and that this indirectly fosters trust? Or have governments in highly cohesive and trusting societies granted immigrants these formal political rights precisely because high levels of trust were already present (Page & Shapiro, 1983; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005)? Based on this cross-sectional research design, it is at this moment impossible to disentangle these causal issues, but it is my belief that certain policies of inclusion emphasize equality and the egalitarian character of the state, which have an important message to convey, as such policies emphasize an overarching identity that unites citizens

as well as immigrants under the umbrella of equal access to citizenship. This is an element, however, that needs further investigation.

The second point of discussion relates to the type and quality of the policy data. Indeed, the coding of the policies measures the closeness of each policy aspect to the EU directives. As such, the MIPEX figures represent a policy score, and they do not depart from any theoretical reflection on migration and integration. Therefore, a further analysis of the reliability and the structure of this data set is called for. Similarly, the data simply measures actual enforced policies in a certain country. However, the local implementation of the policies can – to a considerable extent – differ from how the enacted policies. For instance, it is highly likely that in a number of countries, like for instance Sweden, minority children at school may hold on to their heritage language. Yet, depending on the concentration of ethnic groups in schools this rule can be overruled by the peer pressure to learn the national language. The design of this study makes it, in this respect, impossible to control for the local enforcement of these different policies for every single country. Nevertheless, in this paper, regimes of migrant integration have been under investigation that might theoretically matter in their own respect.

The third issue that needs to be addressed and implies a strategy for further research is the relation between the measures of regimes of migrant integration and the design of this study. The analysis as they have been presented in this paper relate to contextual diversity, i.e. whether trust is lower in areas with high shares of foreigners; the intergroup contact models have not been considered since the design of this study does not allow for it. However, while there have been provided theoretical arguments to relate these regimes to contextual diversity, it might be even more plausible that those regimes are especially designed to foster contact between various groups in society. This perspective is thus largely overlooked in this research while the outcomes are expected to be powerful. Future research strategies should thus implement a strategy in which the relation between policies, diversity, the possibility of intergroup contact and the generation of trust is considered.

This analysis regarding the influence of regimes of migrant integration and diversity on generalized trust therefore, represents us with quite some puzzling findings and challenges for further research. As this paper has shown, with regard to the impact of those regimes it needs to be concluded that the effects are minimal. While the determination of country's trust level on the basis of their national GDP per capita is for instance quite solid, looking at the plots, many countries have enacted policies that differ hugely from what is expected according to the residents' levels of trust. Thus, the relation between migrant integration regimes and trust is far from straightforward compared with other institutional variables that are at hand.

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