CAN MIGRATORY CONTACTS AND REMITTANCES CONTRIBUTE TO RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN RWANDA?

ABSTRACT

Migratory contacts may have both a positive or negative influence on local processes of reconciliation and reconstruction. Migrants from post-conflict Rwanda maintain substantive contacts with their relatives through social networks and the resources they send. Reconstruction and reconciliation programs in post-conflict Rwanda heavily rely on these migratory contacts. However, their impact on attitudinal and behavioural attributes remains a largely underexposed topic. We therefore explore the relationship between migration, reconstruction, and reconciliation processes in post-conflict Rwanda. We analyze the importance of migratory contacts as a major constituent of social capital, and discuss whether and how remittances can be used for mobilizing social capital. Adopting a micro-level perspective, the effects of migratory contacts and remittances on cooperative behaviour and willingness for reconciliation are examined amongst 558 households in Huye District, Southern Rwanda. We scrutinised the relationship between reconciliation and reconstruction, showing that intergroup contact is a key mediating variable. We find that migratory contacts enhance reconstructive behaviour and reconciliatory attitudes, whereas financial remittances result in reduced participation in these processes, indicating that there is a crowding-out effect due to remittance-dependency.

Keywords: remittances, reconstruction, reconciliation, social capital, cooperative behaviour, inter-group contact, Rwanda.

INTRODUCTION

Migrants, who are located in the Western world, may play a large role in post-conflict societies. Quite some studies point to the positive role of these migrants in peace building and reconciliation efforts (Mohamoud, 2006; Newland, 2007; Newland and Patrick, 2004; Demmers, 2002). Newland and Patrick (2004) argue that migrants possess unique strengths since they are cultural experts, able to participate simultaneously in different cultural settings (i.e. the country of origin and the country of destination), and are personally committed to their homeland countries. Other scholars point to the risks of large migrant communities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Koser and Van Hear, 2003; Cochrane, 2007), as one of the main predictors of conflict recurrence.[1][2] This negative influence occurs when migrants start acting as 'long distance nationalists', identified with a romanticised homeland and employing an uncompromising involvement in their homeland politics (Anderson, 1992).

While most attention is usually devoted to direct contributions, the impact of migration and remittances on attitudinal and behavioural attributes remains largely underexposed. In this article, we analyze the relationship between migratory contacts and social capital, and its subsequent impact on individual reconstruction and reconciliation attitudes in post-conflict Rwanda. A micro-level perspective is adopted to disentangle the differential impact of migratory contacts and financial remittances on reconstructive behaviour and reconciliatory attitudes of individual Rwandan citizens that maintain different levels of involvement with their respective family member that reside abroad.

Rwanda is a small and densely populated country that suffered from violent conflict for many decades. In 1994, this conflict culminated into a massive genocide, killing almost 800,000 Rwandans in 100 days (Kanyangara et al., 2007).[1] Rwanda has to deal with broken social ties within society as a result of the ethnic character of the conflict (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). The country is currently involved in a process of

[1] Although there are interesting debates on the influence of migrant *communities*, in this paper will focus only on individual relations of Rwandans with their migrated family members. However, the argument that migrant communities might pose a threat to the stability of their countries of origin is made to point to the ongoing debate on this subject matter. Moreover, if migrant communities are deemed to have a negative influence, for instance due to their 'long distance nationalism', it is likely individuals from these communities will simultaneously utter negative views toward their family members left behind.

[2] Due to the controversies surrounding the term 'diaspora', we decided to avoid using the term as much as possible. Even more so since we are not focusing on diapora, but on individual relations of migrants with their family members left behind. As Brubaker (2005:3) states: 'One dimension of dispersion, then, involves the application of the term diaspora to an ever-broadening set of cases: essentially to any and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed in space. (…) If everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so. The term loses its discriminating power – its ability to pick out phenomena, to make distinctions. The universalisation of diaspora, paradoxically, means the disappearance of diaspora'.

reconciliation and tries to rebuild its economic and social infrastructure. Even though Rwanda has made a remarkable economic recovery after 1994 (Coulibaly et al., 2008), still almost 60 percent of the population live below the $1 poverty line (World Bank, 2006) and inequality is increasing (Ansoms, 2005).

In response to the 1994 genocide and earlier conflicts, massive migration flows emerged, involving over 2 million Rwandans. Most of these migrants fled to neighbouring countries such as Congo, Tanzania, and Burundi, and approximately 200.000 migrants fled to Europe (UNHCR, 2000).[3] Although some of them returned after 1994, still many Rwandans continue to live in exile. These Rwandans that remain scattered over the world, who Lyons (2004) referred to as 'conflict-generated diaspora' (Lyons, 2004), have the potential to influence post-conflict processes. Whether their influence is positive or negative still remains topic of debate. Moreover, even though the relationship between remittances and economic processes has been researched extensively (e.g. Van Hear et al., 2004; De Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Maimbo & Ratha, 2005; World Bank, 2008), the socio-cultural impact on local reconciliation and reconstruction processes remains unclear. Earlier studies on reconstruction (Ansoms, 2005; Coulibaly et al., 2008; Jones, 2006; Justino & Verwimp, 2008) or reconciliation (Brouneus, 2008; Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Molenaar, 2005; Zorbas, 2004) processes in Rwanda devote most attention to the political conditions.

This study focuses instead on the effect of migratory contacts and the remittances on local reconstruction and reconciliation attitudes in Huye District, Rwanda. This enables us to address the key question: *to what extent does the contact of Rwandan citizens with their migrated family members influence reconciliation attitudes and engagement in reconstruction activities?* Survey data were collected from 568 households concerning individual, household and contextual characteristics, using (semi-)structured interviews. Willingness to engage in reconstruction activities is operationalized in terms of cooperative behaviour, while for reconciliation we rely on statements regarding individual feelings and attitudes.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND MIGRANTS IN POST-CONFLICT RWANDA

Social capital is not only a complex concept, it is also widely debated. While some authors assess social capital as a collective resource, others focus more on the concept of connectedness, referring to the connections people use to pursue their personal

[3] Besides the migration flows to neighbouring countries as well as migration flows to Western countries, the conflicts, and especially the 1994 genocide, also caused large numbers of IDPs.

goals (Welzel et al., 2005:124).[2] In line with the latter perspective, we view social capital as the connections people posses, and how people perceive these connections. In this perspective, the contacts Rwandans have with their migrated family members abroad are part of their social capital.

Pichler and Wallace (2007) distinguish between two institutional dimensions of social capital: formal associative behaviour and informal social networks. These dimensions can either complement each other, but informal social capital can also substitute formal social capital. Furthermore, an important distinction can be made between inclusive and exclusive social capital, or as Granovetter (1973) stated it, between strong and weak ties, whereby focusing on weak ties allows for an analysis of between-groups relations. The latter analysis is of special interest for examining post-conflict situations, since reconciliation and reconstruction entails the rebuilding of social capital between opposing groups.

To explain the use of social capital, Putnam (1993) points to the incentives that are necessary for people to actually mobilize social capital. These incentives can be both intrinsic (trust) and extrinsic (institutional opportunities). Putnam (2007) further distinguishes between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to social networks that constitute a homogenous group of people, whereas bridging social capital points to social networks made up of heterogeneous groups. When a society has a large share of bonding, exclusionary social networks, this may negatively affect social cohesion, while bridging social capital is said to enhance social cohesion.

Social capital is considered as a key determinant of social cohesion, reducing latent conflicts through the presence of strong social bonds (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). In a cohesive society where more inclusive mechanisms exist, conflicts can be prevented or mitigated to avoid violence. The most critical task of post-conflict reconstruction is building trust. Trust is of critical importance of for reconciliation, since the lack of confidence in the ex-opponent's intentions may seriously hamper the process of reconciliation (Petrović, 2005).

In addition, vertical ties are also an important element of social capital. These vertical ties encompass relationships with both government and civil society agencies that may facilitate (or hinder) collective action (Fred-Mensah, 2004). Institutions that are perceived to be trustworthy can serve as facilitators and coordinators of human interaction. Trust in government and the judicial system are therefore important constituents of social capital. [3]

Together with economic challenges, such as poverty and rising inequality levels (Ansoms, 2005; Ndikumana, 2001), the restoration of social capital is a pressing challenge Rwanda faces today, since: "The informal social ties in Rwandan society were especially disrupted, since the conflict deeply penetrated such forms of horizontal social capital as exchange, mutual assistance, cooperative action, trust, and protection of the vulnerable" (Colletta & Cullen, 2000, p. 45).

However, social capital might also be a risk factor concerning violent conflicts, since "violent conflict is triggered by the presence of strong exclusionary bonds" (Colletta and Cullen, 2000, p. 16). This certainly occurred in Rwanda, where powerful elites managed to mobilise and pervert social capital, using identity as a social marker. Social capital in Rwanda became not only depleted as a consequence of the genocide, but also a transformation of social capital emerged. This transformation had already begun years before the genocide, where the unravelling of the social fabric resulted in a progressive diminishing of bridging social capital between Rwanda's two main ethnic groups (Hutus and Tutsi's). Using Putnam's (2007) distinction between bonding and bridging social capital, the Rwandan case shows that violence can also be the result of (too) strong bonding social capital, which coexisted with the depletion of bridging social capital.

To recover from the history of violence, the challenge is to balance economic development with social development in a manner that simultaneously enables a nation to find its way out of the darkness of poverty, while encouraging social relations, which cross class, ethnic, and gender divides (Colletta & Cullen (2000). Rwanda provides an example of a country in which society members and civil society actors are actively included in reconstruction processes (see e.g. Fred-Mensah, 2004; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). To reinstall national unity, large-scale, state-led reconciliation programmes have been launched. Popular courts (called *Gacaca*) are extensively used to enhance local reconciliation (Broneus, 2008; Molenaar, 2005). Rwanda's citizens are encouraged to engage into reconciliation committees, solidarity camps and the government labelled itself as 'the government of national unity and reconciliation'. However, the effects of these policies are still unclear, and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) reports that feelings of interpersonal distrust are in fact increasing in Rwanda (NURC, 2008).

Rwandan migrants also direct large flows of remittances to Rwanda (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Mohamoud, 2006). The country received in 2007 about 21

million US$ in individual remittances from abroad (World Bank, 2008).[4] Households with family members abroad that receive remittances are able to generate substantial higher standards of living and experience more food security (Koster, 2008).

Given the heterogeneity of Rwandan migrants, it is difficult to estimate the impact they have on social reconciliation processes within Rwanda. Since migrants are engaged in efforts to contribute to peace and stability, be it individually or within diasporic organisations, it is usually expected to find positive effects of migratory contacts on both the individual feelings of reconciliation and the cooperative behaviour of the Rwandese citizens. However, when trust is low, such as in Rwandan society (Colletta & Cullen, 2000), people tend to free ride and might cooperate less to achieve public goods. Vollan (2008) argues that the dependency on external financial resources distorts communal social relations by affecting individual attitudes and behaviour. The intrinsic motivation to participate in social life is replaced by a "market-like interaction" in which people are less likely to donate time and money.

RECONCILIATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND MIGRATORY NETWORKS

Reconstruction and reconciliation are two important constituents of peace building processes. The (re)building of social capital functions as one of the central elements. According to Galtung (2001, p. 3), reconciliation can be defined as "the process of healing traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relation". Post-conflict reconstruction thus encompasses many aspects of society. Coyne (2005) proposes a holistic definition of post-conflict reconstruction that includes the creation and restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, minimal social services, and structural reform and transformation in the political, economic, social, and security sectors. This implies that post-conflict reconstruction encompasses not only an economic rebuilding of the country, but also a reconstruction of social capital.

Especially in low-income countries, civil war has a larger impact on society, since it not only destroys economic activities but also institutions, civil society, and social contracts such as reciprocity (Elbadawi, 2008). To quote Colletta & Cullen (2000, p 3-4): "Violent conflict within a state weakens its social fabric. […] This damage to a nation's social capital impedes the ability of either communal groups or the state to recover after hostilities cease. Even if other forms of capital are replenished, economic and social development will be hindered unless social capital stocks are

restored". Post-conflict areas are likely to be ruled by conflict again (Junne & Verkoren, 2005), and a low level of social cohesion within a society increases the risk of "social disorganization, fragmentation, and exclusion" (Colletta & Cullen, 2000, p. 13). Cowen and Coyne (2004) thus conclude that the post-conflict stock of social capital is one of the major factors contributing to the level of cooperation in post-conflict societies.

Strategies for reconciliation and reconstruction in post-conflict areas are therefore largely based on restoring social ties and networks, which are considered important constituents for preventing future outbreaks of violence (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; World Bank 1998; Knack & Keefer 1997). In a similar vein, Spence (2001) states that peace building efforts should aim to encourage and support interaction between all sectors of society in order to repair damaged relations and start the process of restoring dignity and trust.

The necessity of so-called 'local participation' in post-conflict reconstruction processes is now increasingly recognized (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). This asks for a more thorough analysis of the intangible aspects of reconstruction programs, instead of solely focusing on activities aimed to foster economic growth. As already acknowledged by Galtung (2001) "To limit reconstruction to rehabilitation and rebuilding is to commit the fallacy of (badly) 'misplaced concreteness' […]. It means being mesmerized by visible (ruins, people in pain, people crying) at the expense of invisible effects" (p. 54). What becomes clear is that the rebuilding of social capital represents an essential element in reconstruction and reconciliation processes.

Since most contemporary conflicts no longer take place between neatly defined borders or territories, there is a tendency for these conflicts to "become dispersed and delocalized" (Demmers, 2002). The 'deterritorialisation' of domestic conflicts is to a large extent a consequence of migration, where the 'conflict-generated diaspora' link processes of globalization to conflicts over identity and territory (Lyons, 2004). Consequently, the connection with migrants and their role in the dynamics of the conflicts in their countries of origin may become a significant force in reconciliation processes. Contacts with migrants who reside in the Western world are often seen as a constituent of social capital, which can play a large role in post-conflict societies (Mohamoud, 2006).[5] However, it is largely unknown, or at least debated, whether the influence of migratory contacts and related remittances streams are positive or negative.

Vollan (2008) argues, in the case of South Africa, that external (financial)

contributions reduce the intrinsic motivation of individuals to support or cooperate with their society members. Similar effects are found in European welfare states when institutionalized social programs take over the role of informal social networks (e.g. Scheepers et al., 2002; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005).

We intend to test this crowding out hypothesis in relation to the influence of remittances. Remittances might lead to resource-dependency for the receiving households (cf. Chimhowu et al., 2005; Maimbo & Ratha, 2005).[6] The regular inflow of remittances becomes part of household income and expenditure patterns, and consequently, remittance-recipients might lose motivation to become industrious and engage in social life. Since the amount of remittances received is often higher than the amount of earnings that the households can generate themselves, people tend to loose their motivation to generate local income, and focus on receiving money from family members abroad (UNFPA, 2005). This crowding out effect might thus reduce people's reconciliation feelings and make them less willing to engage in reconstructive behaviour, as a consequence of their remittance-dependency. We will empirically test this hypothesis with micro-data in the following sections.

DATA AND APPROACH

Data is collected in Huye district, located in the Southern Province of Rwanda, consisting of 14 *imirenge* (sectors), and 77 *utugeri* (cells). The cells in Huye district contain a total of 509 *imidugudu* (villages), representing the smallest administrative unit in Rwanda. Huye district offers an relevant case study area, since (a) it contains both urban, semi-urban and rural areas, (b) the population is originally very mixed in terms of ethnicity, (c) as a consequence of its ethnic diversity the region was highly affected by both the civil war and the 1994 Genocide (Des Forges, 1999; Justino & Verwimp, 2008; Mamdani, 2001), and (d) the region has one of the highest level of poverty in Rwanda in 2006.[7]

The sample includes 568 households distributed over 91 villages and 14 sectors and is considered representative for Huye District (for detailed information on sample composition, see Appendix 1). Data is collected by means of face-to-face interviews (questionnaires), conducted during a three-week period in November 2008, by fourteen bachelor students from the Department of Applied Statistics of the National University of Rwanda (NUR). The questionnaire was translated into Kinyarwanda, and, as a crosscheck, translated back into English.

Dependent variables

The dependent variables are (a) individual cooperative behaviour and (b) individual feelings of reconciliation. Individual cooperative behaviour is operationalised as the number of memberships of civil society organizations.[8] Civil society organizations include: churches or religious organizations, sports and leisure clubs, non-profit organizations, savings and credit groups, labour unions, women's groups, youth groups, and other civil society organizations. Individual feelings of reconciliation were measured by directly asking people the extent to which they feel reconciled with past atrocities that occurred during the genocide in 1994. Responses were measured with a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 'a great deal' to 5 'not at all'. Table 1 provides an overview of the variables.

>> insert Table 1 <<

Individual and Household Characteristics

Average age of the household heads was 38.6 years. Most household representatives were married (58.6%); 15.1% of the respondents were widowed, and only 3.0% reported to be divorced. The percentage of respondents without education was relatively low (14.6%); most respondents had attained primary education (49.8%), and 35.0% had completed secondary or tertiary level of education.[4]

Since referring to ethnic identities has become increasingly difficult in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2008), the experience of the respondent during genocide was used to socially classify the respondents in three categories. Portraying Rwanda as a bi-polar society would offer an incomplete picture, since people's roles were not only diverse during the genocide, their roles also shifted, and, as a consequence of the mass returns after 1994, Rwanda's society has been completely reconfigured (Purdeková, 2008; Fujii, 2009). The first category captures the group of returnees, who were abroad during genocide (15.7%). The second category includes those who were in Rwanda, but who were not threatened by the Interahamwe (41.9%).[9] The third category consists of people who were in Rwanda during genocide and who were threatened by the Interahamwe (39.3%).[10]

Household expenditures were used as a proxy for income. Expenditures are a better estimate of permanent income, since income in rural areas is less stable

[4] Educational attainment levels in our sample are relatively high, compared to national statistics. This is due to the over-sampling of households who have family members abroad. Our analyses show that household representatives of these households have, on average, a higher level of education than household representatives of households that do not have family members abroad.

(Deaton, 1997; Narayan & Pritchett, 1997). The variables 'assets per capita' and 'income per capita' are converted to logarithms to avoid non-linearity of the data.[11] Furthermore, we calculated the male-female ratio (Mean 0.48, SD 0.22) by dividing the number of males by the total household size (Mean 5.71, SD 2.58). The dependency rate (Mean 0.42, SD 0.25) was calculated as the number of dependents (children aged < 18, elderly aged > 65) divided by the total household size.

Individual beliefs and attitudes

To ensure that our analyses are sufficiently robust, we controlled for beliefs and attitudes which can influence reconstruction behaviour and reconciliation attitudes. Reconciliation is generally measured as a multidimensional concept and operationalised accordingly into different sets of - sometimes partly overlapping - attitudes (Pham et al., 2004). Elements of reconciliation derived from previous studies include: perceived vulnerability (Biro and Milin, 2005; Kanyangara et al., 2007; Petrović's, 2005; Pham et al., 2004), social distance & xenophobia (Gibson, 2004; Nadler and Liviatan, 2006; Petrović, 2005), social capital (network ties and trust) (Colletta and Cullen, 2000; Fred-Mensah, 2004; Nadler and Liviatan, 2006; Pichler and Wallace, 2007;), and feelings of justice (Biro and Milin, 2005; Broneus, 2008; Gibson, 2004; Meernik, 2005; Molenaar, 2005; Pham et al., 2004). An overview of the scores on these individual dimensions and attitudes is shown in Table 2. We used principal component analysis to construct four scale parameters (i.e. social distance scale, emotional climate scale, and interpersonal trust and government trust), and examined the scale reliability and validity (See Appendix 2).

>> INSERT Table 2 <<

Perceived Vulnerability: Four items are used to measure perceived vulnerability. The first item is directly related to the conflict and refers to whether respondents felt that the recurrence of conflict is a real danger. The next two items measure the extent to which respondents feel financially vulnerable: whether people perceived an income improvement compared to the situation before 1994 and the degree of satisfaction with the current financial situation of the household (cf. Pham et al. 2004). Furthermore, the Perceived Emotional Climate Scale was employed, based on methods developed by Kanyangara et al. (2007) to assess the impact of the Gacaca

trials on the perception of the current emotional climate of Rwandan society, rated on a five-point Likert scale.

Social Distance & Xenophobia: Xenophobia was measured with two statements, derived from Gibson (2004). The first statement ('I like people with different values') was positively formulated, whereas the second statement ('Listening to people with other values is a waste of time') was negatively formulated. Disagreeing with the first, and agreeing with the second statement, indicates xenophobia. Social contact is measured through the frequency of contacts with other groups reflecting different levels of intimacy, derived from Bogardus' scale (1926) (see also: Binder et al., 2009).

Horizontal and Vertical ties: Three items are used to measure horizontal and vertical ties. First, participation in informal networks is measured with the following statement: 'I have many contacts in my own village' using a 5-point Likert scale Second, interpersonal trust is measured with a set of seven items derived from the World Values Survey (2008). The average score of 3. 13 indicates relatively low levels of trust.[12] Third, the level of governmental trust was assessed, composed of three items. The response categories for all items ranged from 1 'completely trust' to 5 'not at all'. Our survey results indicate very high institutional trust, in line with earlier findings from NURC (2008) that indicate that 97% of respondents are positive about the government, similar to the results of The World Values Study (2008) that indicate that 78.8 % of the Rwandans find their government trustworthy (78.8%). This reflects the image of the Rwandan government as being extremely influential: 'Rwanda is known for the profound influence of central authority in its society. Even in the remotest areas of the country, the influence of the central government is extensive' (Molenaar, 2005: 48).

Perceived Justice: To measure how the respondents perceive the justice systems that are currently operational in Rwanda, three statements were used. Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they feel favourable toward the ICTR, the National Courts, and the *Gacaca* trials, respectively (cf. Pham et al., 2004). Likert scales were provided as response options, ranging from 1 'very favourable' to 5 'very unfavourable'. Most feelings are neutral to favourable, while *Gacaca* trials are generally considered more favourable.

Contact with the migrant community

45.1% of the respondents have contacts with migrated family members and friends living in Western countries. Most of them have only one contact abroad (57.1%),

whereas 42.9% has two contacts, 11.3% has three contacts, and 7.4% has four or more contacts abroad. Most of the contacts abroad are aged between 30-40 years. The majority of contacts abroad left Rwanda 15 years ago (around 1994), implying that they left just before, during, or just after genocide. Most contacts abroad can thus be classified as 'conflict-generated' migrants. The gender distribution is equal, challenging the popular viewpoint that migration is only for men. Furthermore, in line with the literature (e.g. Chimhowu et al., 2005), we see that most of the contacts abroad are higher educated, i.e. secondary level or higher.

In our sample, 163 households (28.7%) received remittances from abroad in the past twelve months previous to the interview.[13] This means that 73.7 percent of the households that have family members living abroad also received remittances (Pearson r = .671, p<.000). On average, respondents received 331.000 RWF (€ 434) (SD RWF 393000 or € 471.10) during the past twelve months. Additionally, the total value of goods they received in the past twelve months was estimated at 170.000 RWF (233€) (SD RWF 211000 or € 252.93). Since the variable was right-skewed, ait was transformed by taking the square root of the total value. After the transformation, the variable ranged from 0 to 165.10 (M 15.48, SD 30.79).

Only some respondents received remittances on a regular basis (42.7%) compared to respondents who receive their remittances irregularly (57.3%). According to Koster (2008) remittances in Rwanda often depend on special occasions, such as births, funerals and marriages. This implies that - contrary to views by e.g. De Haas (2003), who studied remittance flows in Morocco - remittances hardly provide a stable source of income in Rwanda.

Contextual data

To control for sector-level differences, we included three context variables: (a) the percentage of genocide survivors per sector, to control for the potential influence of governmental involvement in income dynamics, (b) the number of cooperatives per sector, as to control for the opportunities one has to become a member of a cooperative, and (c) the mean number of cattle per person per sector, as a proxy for urbanisation. For a detailed overview, see Annex 1.

RESULTS

The likelihood of Migratory Contacts & Receiving Remittances

Before examining the effects on reconciliation and reconstruction, we first conducted two logistic regression analyses: (1) what is the likelihood for households to have family abroad, and (2) what are the odds of respondents to receive remittances? In both analyses, individual, household, and context characteristics are taken as the independent variables. The results are presented in Table 3.[14]

>> INSERT Table 3 <<

Results show that older respondents are more likely to have family abroad. This is probably due to Rwanda's history of large migration flows, especially between independence in 1961 and the civil war in 1994. Therefore, older respondents are more likely to have contacts abroad and to receive remittances. Both for having migratory contacts and receiving remittances, the chances are higher for women. This is in line with existing literature on women and migration (e.g. Kunz, 2008; Spaan & Moppes, 2006). Our results also support earlier findings of Chimhowu et al. (2005) that the higher educated are more likely to have migratory contacts and receive remittances. Higher educated respondents have more higher educated friends/family members, and since the higher educated are more likely to migrate, higher educated respondents have more contacts with the migrant community. The effects of education are strongest for those with secondary or tertiary education.

Household representatives that were abroad during genocide are more likely to have family abroad. This is probably due to the fact that they are part of the same ethnic group, which was forced to flee the country at the time of genocide. However, the status during the genocide does not affect the likelihood of receiving remittances.

With respect to household characteristics, families with more assets and higher income have a higher chance of having family abroad and to receive remittances. Since migration is usually a costly business, especially when it concerns migration to Western countries, people with higher incomes are more likely to migrate. Their friends/family members who stayed behind, usually also have a higher income. Therefore, respondents with higher incomes are more likely to have migratory contacts and receiving remittances (cf. Lindley, 2008; De Haas, 2006; Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006). Households that have a higher male-female ratio are also more likely to have family abroad, but this effect is not significant for receiving remittances.

Individual Cooperative Behaviour and Feelings of Reconciliation

Table 5 shows the results of the regression for reconstructive behaviour, i.e. cooperative behaviour, and feelings of reconciliation. In model 1, the influence of individual characteristics, individual beliefs, two contextual characteristics, migratory contact, and financial remittances are assessed. In model 2, four additional interaction variables are included.

>> INSERT Table 4 <<

Since respondents have been purposely sampled (whether or not they have contact with migrants), we tested for selection bias using the Heckman two-stage procedure. Since the LAMDBA coefficient proved to be not significant, the analyses could be done without using this correction factor. Furthermore, we examined whether there is spatial between-sector variance. Intra-class correlation coefficient is very low for both equations (0.03 and 0.01), indicating that these between-sector variances are negligible, thus OLS regression could be used instead of multi-level analysis.

Individual and household characteristics

Gender does not determine whether respondents employ individual cooperative behaviour or whether they feel reconciled. The results clearly show that higher educated people are much more active within formal networks, compared to their uneducated counterparts, but educational attainment cannot predict the respondents' feelings of reconciliation. While age does not determine cooperative behaviour, it does have a significant negative, albeit small, effect on feelings of reconciliation. Older people are more likely to have more vivid, traumatic memories of the genocide, and hence feel less reconciled.

Clear differences appear between people who were abroad during the genocide, and those who stayed in Rwanda and were threatened by the *Interahamwe*, compared to people who were not threatened. People that stayed abroad show less cooperative behaviour, which might be explained by their out-group position as a result of their refugee-history. Those who were abroad and those who were threatened by the *Interahamwe* feel significantly less reconciled compared to those who were not threatened. The group that was threatened probably experienced more traumatic events, such as the loss of family members or friends, and therefore feels less reconciled. Former refugees (those who were abroad during the genocide) strongly identify with those who were threatened, and therefore they also feel less reconciled.

Households that possess more assets also reveal higher levels of cooperation. However, neither wealth nor income is able to predict feelings of reconciliation. Household size favours cooperative behaviour, while the dependency rate does not. The more members a household has, the more one is able to cooperate, but for feelings of reconciliation these effects are exactly opposite. Household size does not influence feelings of reconciliation, yet the dependency rate does: the more dependents there are in a household, the less reconciled one feels. Although real income or wealth does not influence feelings of reconciliation, households with more dependents are likely to feel economically unsatisfied. This perceived income deprivation might explain that respondents feel less reconciled.

Social capital

Informal networks and interpersonal trust have a clear positive effect on cooperative behaviour. With respect to feelings of reconciliation, social capital has a negative effect, with governmental trust being the exception. The Rwandan government has made reconciliation a priority policy, and governmental trust levels are extremely high (NURC, 2008), explaining that trust in the government positively affects reconciliation.

Migratory contact is also positively related to reconciliation and reconstructive behaviour. Those who have such contacts, tend to feel more reconciled and show more cooperative behaviour. However, when people receive financial remittances from their contacts abroad, the effect turns negative. As argued by Chimhowu et al. (2005), remittance-dependency diminishes the intrinsic motivation to participate in social life. In the same vein, those who depend on remittances are less motivated to participate in the process of reconciliation and show less cooperative behaviour. These findings contradict previous studies by Mohamoud (2003), who found that remittances have a strong trickle-down effect, meaning that not only the direct receivers of remittances profit, but indirectly also the extended family or even the community. This contradiction might be explained using the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam, 2007). Since reconciliation is also based on the extent to which different groups in society interact peacefully, bridging social capital will be necessary to foster reconciliation, while exclusionary, bonding social capital might actually obstruct reconciliation (cf. Colletta and Cullen, 2000). The same holds for reconstruction, i.e. the effect of social capital depends on the extent one has contact with the other groups. When remittance-dependency depletes

motivations to actively participate in social life, this might result in fewer investments in bridging social capital. In other words, remittance-dependency causes cooperative behaviour to be only directed to the own group, and tends to make respondents feel less reconciled.

The interaction effects with intergroup contact and trust indeed indicate a different effect of bonding (little out-group contact) and bridging (much out-group contact) social capital on cooperative behaviour and feelings of reconciliation (see Model 2 in Table 4). First, respondents with bonding social capital, i.e. high interpersonal/governmental trust levels, and little out-group contact, feel less reconciled and show less cooperative behaviour. Respondents with bridging social capital, i.e. high levels of interpersonal trust combined with much out-group contact, have more positive feelings of reconciliation and more cooperative behaviour.

Feelings toward justice systems

Feelings toward the justice system exhibit a negative influence on individual cooperative behaviour, with the exception of the national courts. A different picture emerges when looking at feelings of reconciliation: the more favourable one stands toward the ICTR, the less reconciled one feels. The effect of *Gacaca* is opposite: people feel substantially more reconciled when they hold favourable feelings toward the popular *Gacaca* courts. The difference between these two courts might well be caused by their very nature. Where the ICTR operates on an international level, *Gacaca* courts take place at a grassroots level. Pham et al. (2004) also found different levels of support for these three judicial systems: 90.8 % supported the *Gacaca* trials, 67.8% the national courts, and only 42.1% the ICTR. This corresponds with our findings, and indicates that the accessibility of justice is important for Rwandans for contributing themselves to reconciliation. The negative effect of the ICTR could also be caused by the criticisms it received, including from the Rwandan government.[15] In general terms, believing in the sincerity of those accused positively influences feelings of reconciliation, however, negatively influences cooperative behaviour.

Individual cooperative behaviour and reconciliation

The effect of feelings of reconciliation on cooperative behaviour seems at first sight to be negative: the more one feels reconciled, the less one cooperates. However, we expect again a mediating effect of intergroup contact, which is indeed supported by our results. For those who have high levels of intergroup contact, feelings of

reconciliation do have a positive influence on cooperative behaviour, while for those who have low levels of intergroup contact, feelings of reconciliation reduce their participation in formal networks.

Looking at the impact of cooperative behaviour on reconciliation, the direct effect is negative, but the expected mediating effect of intergroup contact is again confirmed by our results. The effect for respondents with low levels of intergroup contact is negative, while the effect of respondents with high levels of intergroup contact is positive. Hence, for those with higher levels of intergroup contact, the relation between reconciliation and reconstruction is unmistakably positive.

Contextual characteristics

For contextual variables indicating the percentage of genocide survivors and the number of cooperatives per sector no significant effects were found on cooperative behaviour. However, the results show that when a higher number of genocide survivors live in a sector, people feel more reconciled. One of the aims of the NURC (2008) is to support community-based reconciliation committees and victim support groups. Therefore, when there are more survivors living in a sector, it is likely that there is more focus on reconciliation efforts.[16] Furthermore, the more cooperatives are present in a given sector, the more reconciled people feel. This indicates that cooperatives, which are primarily joined out of economic interests, have a positive spill-over effect on socio-cultural feelings of reconciliation.

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS

While it is widely recognised that migrants - especially those located in the Western world - influence post-conflict processes, it is still hardly understood how the relation between migratory contacts and remittances on reconciliation and reconstruction processes is structured.

Rwanda's society is currently characterized by strongly differentiated feelings of reconciliation between different societal groups. Those who were victimised in Rwanda, or who strongly identify with the victims, are still not fully able to participate in the process of reconciliation. Moreover, former refugees cooperate less with other groups within the society, as a result of their former out-group position. This could pose a serious threat for long-term peace and stability in Rwanda, since social imbalances are considered a trigger for violence (Addison & Murshed, 2001; Mohamoud, 2006). Contact with migrants located in the Western world, however,

could have a positive influence on the processes of reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda: they enhance feelings of reconciliation and foster cooperative behaviour.

The findings of our study clearly indicate that prospects for reconstruction and reconciliation largely depend on the extent to which different groups in society interact peacefully. Especially bridging social capital based on strong interpersonal and governmental trust will be necessary to foster post-conflict processes, while exclusionary bonding social capital blocks these processes. While migratory contacts tend to favour engagement with reconstruction and reconciliation, remittances-dependency may deplete motivations to actively participate in social life, resulting in fewer investments in bridging social capital, and consequently, in less reconciliation feelings and reduced cooperative behaviour

Future studies should therefore differentiate between migratory contacts and receiving remittances. The crowding-out effect of remittances-dependency diminishes motivations to participate in social life, and hence, in reconciliation and reconstruction processes. Even while the direct economic impact of remittances might be positive, there can be serious side effects at other impact levels. As argued by De Haas (2005, p. 1275): "Under unfavourable conditions remittances may hardly lead to investment and development, but instead to a retreat of migrants and their families from social and economic activities in the sending countries simply because remittances give them the freedom to do so". Further research should gain insight under which conditions the trade-off between the positive social effects of migratory contacts and the crowding-out effect of remittances can be overcome.

For policy purposes, it is overwhelmingly clear that the establishment of bridging social capital networks, focusing on enabling social interactions between the different groups within Rwandan society, deserves to be stimulated. The available evidence seems to suggest that local, popular-based institutions, public and private trust, and schooling provide basic conditions for effectively linking international migratory networks into local and national reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. The sequential nature of the reconciliation-reconstruction nexus still deserves additional research.

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TABLES

Table 1: Dependent variables (N=568)

Variable	Categories	*f*	P	Variable	Categories	*f*	P
Feelings of reconciliation	A great deal	20	3.5	Civil society memberships	0	38	6.7
	Somewhat	306	53.9		1	172	30.3
	Not very much	82	14.4		2	153	26.9
	Hardly	99	17.4		3	96	16.9
	Not at all	55	9.7		4 >	104	18.5
	Missing	6	1.1		Missing	4	0.7

Table 2. Individual Beliefs and Attitudes of Respondents (Number/Percentage & Mean/SD)

Variables	***f* (P)**	**Variables**	***f* (P)**
Perceived Vulnerability		**Horizontal and Vertical ties**	
Recurrence of conflict is a real danger		*Many social contacts in village*	
Strongly disagree	188 (33.1)	Strongly disagree	11 (1.9)
Disagree	244 (43.0)	Disagree	26 (4.6)
Neutral	62 (10.9)	Neutral	8 (1.4)
Agree	51 (9.0)	Agree	237 (41.7)
Strongly agree	2 (0.4)	Strongly agree	285 (50.2)
Missing data	21 (3.7)	Missing data	1 (0.2)
Satisfaction with current financial sit. of household		*Interpersonal trust*	3.13 (0.82)
Very unsatisfied	163 (28.7)	*Government trust*	1.43 (0.61)
Fairly unsatisfied	173 (30.5)	**Feelings toward Justice**	
Neutral	133 (23.4)	*Feelings toward the ICTR*	
Fairly satisfied	85 (15.0)	Very favourable	38 (6.7)
Very satisfied	14 (2.5)	Favourable	226 (39.8)
Perceived income compared to pre 1994 situation		Neutral	172 (30.3)
Much worse	84 (14.8)	Unfavourable	90 (15.8)
Worse	214 (37.7)	Very unfavourable	35 (6.2)
Similar	45 (7.6)	Missing data	7 (1.2)
Improved	66 (11.6)	*Feelings toward National Courts*	
Strongly improved	153 (26.9)	Very favourable	103 (18.1)
Missing data	6 (1.1)	Favourable	342 (60.2)
Emotional Climate		Neutral	100 (17.6)
Perceived Positive Emotional Climate	3.90 (0.71)	Unfavourable	16 (2.8)
		Very unfavourable	1 (0.2)
		Missing data	6 (1.1)
Social Distance & Xenophobia		*Feelings toward Gacaca*	
Like people with different values than me		Very favourable	223 (39.3)
Strongly disagree	13 (2.3)	Favourable	225 (39.6)
Disagree	85 (15.0)	Neutral	71 (12.5)
Neutral	36 (6.3)	Unfavourable	35 (6.2)
Agree	365 (64.3)	Very unfavourable	8 (1.4)
Strongly agree	69 (12.1)	Missing data	6 (1.1)
Listening to opposing viewpoints is a waste of time		*Those asking for pardon are sincere*	
Strongly disagree	81 (14.3)	Strongly disagree	53 (9.3)
Disagree	277 (48.8)	Disagree	116 (20.4)
Neutral	43 (7.6)	Neutral	126 (22.2)
Agree	151 (26.6)	Agree	232 (48.8)
Strongly agree	16 (2.8)	Strongly agree	28 (4.9)
Social Contact	2.19 (1.13)	Missing data	13 (2.3)

Table 3. The Likelihood of having Migratory Contacts and Receiving Remittances

	Migratory Contacts		Receiving Remittances	
	B (S.E.)	Exp(B)	B (S.E.)	Exp(B)
Constant	-10.181 (1.488)	n.a.	-9.233 (1.549)	n.a.
Individual characteristics				
Age	0.031 (0.009)	1.031**	0.019 (0.009)	1.019**
Gender				
Male *(ref.)*				
Female	0.433 (0.216)	1.542*	0.450 (0.231)	1.569*
Marital status				
Single (*ref.)*				
Married	-0.229 (0.267)	0.796	-0.187 (0.282)	0.829
Divorced	-0.074 (0.589)	0.928	0.573 (0.587)	1.773
Widowed	-0.266 (0.409)	0.766	-0.133 (0.429)	0.876
Educational attainment				
No education (*ref.)*				
Primary	0.526 (0.316)	1.693*	0.077 (0.337)	1.080
Secondary or higher	0.772 (0.348)	2.164**	0.710 (0.364)	2.035*
Church attendance	0.057 (0.092)	1.059	0.085 (0.096)	1.089
Status during the genocide				
Not threatened *(ref.)*				
Abroad	0.663 (0.282)	1.940**	0.461 (0.293)	1.585
Threatened	0.161 (0.206)	1.174	0.102 (0.222)	1.107
Household characteristics				
Household size	0.014 (0.039)	1.014	-0.012 (0.041)	0.988
Dependency rate	0.656 (0.429)	1.928	0.648 (0.452)	1.911
Male female ratio	0.880 (0.456)	2.410*	0.496 (0.483)	1.642
Income per capita (ln)	0.495 (0.124)	1.640***	0.395 (0.131)	1.485***
Assets per capita (ln)	0.126 (0.063)	1.134**	0.157 (0.070)	1.170**
Context characteristics				
Cattle per person	0.821 (0.599)	2.272	0.898 (0.632)	2.455
Test statistics	χ^2***; df***	**p**	χ^2***; df***	**p**
Overall model evaluation				
Likelihood ratio test	78.357; 16	.000	62.008; 16	.000
Goodness of fit test				
Hosmer & Lemeshow	4.646; 8	.759	5.909; 8	.657
Cox and Snell R^2	.131		.105	
Nagelkerke R^2	.171		.150	

****p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10*

Table 4. OLS Regression with Individual Cooperative Behaviour and Feelings of Reconciliation				
	Individual Cooperative Behaviour		Feelings of Reconciliation	
	Model 1: B (S.E.)	**Model 2: B (S.E.)**	**Model 1: B (S.E.)**	**Model 2: B (S.E.)**
Constant	1.860 (1.351)*	2.549 (1.204)**	2.978 (1.035)***	2.624 (.922)***
Individual Characteristics				
Gender, male = 0	0.066 (.125)	0.076 (.123)	0.035 (0.096)	0.036 (.096)
Age, years	-0.003 (.005)	-0.002 (.005)	-0.005 (0.004)*	-0.006 (.004)**
Educational Attainment				
No education (ref.)				
Primary	0.275 (.183)*	0.304 (.181)**	0.075 (0.141)	0.078 (.140)
Secondary or >	0.879 (.211)***	0.873 (.208)***	0.045 (.166)	0.015 (.164)
Place of Residence during the Genocide				
Not threatened by the Interahamwe (ref.)				
Abroad	-0.335 (.206)**	-0.375 (.205)**	-0.339 (.159)**	-0.298 (.158)**
Threatened by the Interahamwe	-0.036 (.144)	-0.067 (.142)	-0.306 (.110)***	-0.299 (.109)***
Household characteristics				
Household size	0.051 (.025)**	0.040 (.025)**	0.005 (.019)	0.003 (.019)
Dependency rate	-0.163 (.268)	-0.048 (.266)	-0.412 (.206)**	-0.357 (.205)**
Income per capita (ln)	0.002 (.081)	0.005 (.080)	-0.035 (.062)	-0.026 (.062)
Wealth per capita (ln)	0.046 (.042)	0.052 (.042)	-0.012 (.032)	-0.012 (.032)
Individual Beliefs & Attitudes				
Feelings of reconciliation	-0.112 (.061)**	-0.103 (.060)**	n.a.	n.a.
Perceived Vulnerability				
Perceived feelings of experienced trauma	-0.152 (.116)*	-0.136 (.115)	-0.077 (.090)	-0.071 (.089)
Recurrence of the conflict is a real danger	0.023 (.070)	0.027 (.070)	0.238 (.053)***	0.216 (.053)***
Satisfaction with the current financial situation	0.028 (.061)	0.017 (.061)	0.070 (.047)*	0.068 (.047)*
Perceived income level compared to < 1994	0.018 (.045)	0.028 (.044)	0.048 (.035)*	0.050 (.034)*
Perceived Emotional Climate (positive)	-0.051 (.103)	-0.069 (.102)	0.068 (.079)	0.053 (.079)
Social Distance & xenophobia				
Social Contact	-0.009 (.056)	-0.034 (.057)	0.044 (.043)	0.043 (.043)
Like people with different values than me	-0.008 (.069)	-0.016 (.069)	0.169 (.053)***	0.168 (.053)***
Listening to opposing views is waste of time	0.012 (.056)	0.008 (.056)	-0.098 (.043)***	-0.097 (.043)***
Horizontal and Vertical ties				
Formal networks	n.a.	n.a.	-0.067 (.036)**	-0.068 (.036)**
Informal networks	0.157 (.071)**	0.149 (.071)**	-0.083 (.055)*	-0.088 (.055)*
Governmental trust	-0.011 (.103)	0.011 (.102)	0.105 (.079)*	0.130 (.079)**
Interpersonal trust	0.126 (.089)*	0.083 (.089)	-0.049 (.069)	-0.069 (.069)
Contact with Migrant Community				
Contact with family members abroad	0.407 (.151)***	0.429 (.149)***	0.221 (.117)**	0.210 (.116)**
Remittances (root)	-0.006 (.002)***	-0.006 (.002)***	-0.005 (.002)***	-0.005 (.002)***
Feelings toward Justice Systems				
Feelings toward the ICTR	-0.286 (.066)***	-0.270 (.065)***	-0.112 (.051)**	-0.098 (.051)**
Feelings toward the National Courts	0.095 (.094)	0.089 (.093)	-0.115 (.072)*	-0.119 (.072)**
Feelings toward the Gacaca trials	-0.141 (.071)**	-0.136 (.071)**	0.115 (.055)**	0.109 (.055)**
Belief in sincerity of accused asking pardon	-0.100 (.064)*	-0.118 (.064)**	0.085 (.050)**	0.078 (.049)*
Contextual characteristics				
Percentage of genocide survivors, per sector	-0.011 (.016)	-0.010 (.015)	0.032 (.012)***	0.033 (.012)***
Number of Cooperatives, per sector	-0.016 (.017)	-0.016 (.017)	0.024 (.013)**	0.022 (.013)**
Interaction variables				
Social contact * Feelings of reconciliation		0.192 (.055)***		n.a.
Social contact * **Formal networks**		n.a.		0.087 (.031)***
Social contact * Informal networks		0.083 (0.063)*		0.048 (.050)
Social contact * Governmental trust		-0.139 (.091)*		-0.013 (.071)
Social contact * Interpersonal trust		0.135 (.067)**		0.070 (.052)*
Model Summary: Overall Statistics				
df1, df 2	30, 453	34, 449	30, 453	34, 449
F	3.322***	3.545***	4.484***	4.406***
Adjusted Rsquare	0.126	0.152	0.178	0.193
Durbin-Watson	1.798	1.818	1.738	1.743

****p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10*

APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE COMPOSITION & REGIONAL CONTROLS

Table A1: Sample size and controls by sector

	Sample			Controls		
Sector	Population size	Sample size	% with contacts abroad	% Genocide survivors of total population	Mean number of cattle per person	Number of cooperatives
1. Mbazi	25 525	42	50.0	16.09	0.48	8
2. Kinazi	18 450	43	51.2	5.10	0.72	4
3. Simbi	22 876	46	43.5	1.88	0.55	4
4. Maraba	22 595	37	32.4	2.98	0.52	7
5. Rwaniro	21 290	37	51.4	2.05	0.61	7
6. Rusatira	27 017	39	38.5	2.44	0.51	17
7. Huye	19 392	35	45.7	7.67	0.44	6
8. Gishamvu	11 955	29	31.0	4.78	0.53	1
9. Mukura	15 963	32	50.0	10.66	0.51	3
10. Ruhashya	18 156	64	48.4	6.28	0.61	5
11. Tumba	23 666	42	50.0	7.22	0.26	5
12. Kigoma	18 557	34	50.0	3.92	0.82	6
13. Ngoma	13 465	33	48.5	12.31	0.22	12
14. Karama	31 770	55	43.6	5.90	0.30	4
Huye Total	290 677	568	45.6	6.30	0.51	89

Source: Republic of Rwanda (2007)

Note:; for the sample size, maximum variability (p = .5), and a confidence level was set at 95% (t = 1.96) with a 5% margin of error (= 0.05). Sample size was increased with a non-response insurance factor (10%).

APPENDIX 2: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSES

Table A2: Principal Components Analysis: Component Matrix		
Social Contact Scale	Component 1 (71.6 %; Cronbach	0.85; KMO 0.75)
Contact with the other group on a typical working day	0.91	
Contact with the other group outside work	0.88	
Frequency of sharing a meal with the other group	0.88	
Close personal friends from the other group	0.68	
Positive Emotional Climate Scale	Component 1 (63,0 %; Cronbach	0.70; KMO 0.65)
People in Rwanda manifest solidarity and mutual help	0.84	
People in Rwanda trust their institutions	0.81	
People in Rwanda manifest mutual confidence	0.74	
Institutional Trust Scale	Component 1 (78.7 %; Cronbach	0.86; KMO 0.73)
Trust in the police	0.90	
Trust in the armed forces	0.89	
Trust in the government	0.87	
Interpersonal Trust Scale	Component 1 (54.2 %; Cronbach	0.86; KMO 0.88))
Trust in your neighbourhood	0.73	
Trust in people you personally know	0.74	
Trust in people from neighbouring cells	0.83	
Trust in people you meet for the first time	073	
Trust in people from another religion	0.71	
Trust in nationality	0.69	
Trust in people of the other group	0.71	

NOTE: KMO = Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin test for suitability Principal Component Analysis; Barthlett's Test of Sphericity (BTS) confirmed significant relationships.

NOTES

[1] Estimates vary: Des Forges (1999) refers to almost 500.000 Rwandans who lost their lives, while Mamdani (2001), speaks of between 10 and 50 thousand Hutu, and between 500,000 and a million Tutsi.
[2] Coleman (1988, 1990) and Granovetter (1973) view social capital as a form of connectedness, as a collective resource, which as such enables people to engage in collective action.
[3] This is particularly reinforced by the Truth Commissions in South Africa. The underlying assumption is that the commission bring reconciliation by means of reporting the true events and pointing out those responsible for the atrocities committed (Gibson, 2004)
[4] However, only formally recorded remittances are included in these numbers; when informal money transfers are taken into account, the true value is expected to be much higher.
[5] Western-based migrant communities are more influential compared to migrant communities in neighbouring countries, since they have more access to resources (Mohamoud, 2006; Newland and Patrick, 2004). Therefore, we focus attention on contacts with migrants residing in Western countries.
[6] On a community or country level, this might lead to a so-called 'Migration Dependency Cycle', or 'Migrant Syndrome', i.e. a vicious cycle of migration that is maintained through, for example, low job opportunities in the country of origin as a result of the migration patterns (Reichert, 1981).
[7] 67.3 percent of the population is poor, compared to a national percentage of 56.9 percent (National Institute of Statistics Rwanda (NISR), 2008). Almost five percent of the population lives in extreme poverty, with Rusatira and Mukura having the highest numbers: 13.8 and 12.2 percent, respectively (Republic of Rwanda, 2007).
8 These civil society organizations are ethnically diverse, since any reference to ethnic identities is forbidden in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
[9] Referring to the *Interahamwe* is a generally accepted way to describe the perpetrators of the genocide. It can be assumed that those who fall within this category are all Hutu. However, this label does not force people to explain the role, or roles, they had during the genocide, since this might be too painful or lead to socially desirable answers
[10] This is a broad category, but it avoids the pitfall of assuming all victims were Tutsi.
[11] Originally, the average assets per capita were RWF 1,465,000 (€ 17556,14) with a standard deviation of RWF 317,902 (€ 381.08). Income per capita was originally RWF 2,748,454 (€ 3290.50) on average, with a standard deviation of RWF 3,337,280 (€4000.50). After the transformation the skewness and kurtosis for assets per capita are -0.87 and 2.16, respectively, and -0.11 and 0.13 for income per capita.
[12] According to the NURC (2008), feelings of distrust rose in recent years: in 2007, 58% of the people distrusted others, compared to 49% in 2005. The World Values Study (2008), however, revealed higher levels of interpersonal trust: 89.7% trusts their neighbours, 80.5% trusts people they personally know, but only 34.5% trusts people they meet for the first time. The results of our study are more in line with the NURC report, indicating low levels of interpersonal trust.
[13] Remittances are measured as the transfer of both money and goods.
[14] It is not our intention to claim causality. We realise the reciprocal relationship between certain variables, but this analysis addresses only the extent to which (e.g.) income is related to migratory contacts and remittance receipt.
[15] These critiques include that the ICTR 'has been plagued by mismanagement and lack of resources (...) failing to provide justice because of the slow trials and inadequate sentencing (...) its lack of concern and protection for witnesses' (Lambourne, 2004).
[16] Unfortunately, exact figures on these committees and support groups are lacking, but it is very plausible that the relation between the percentage survivors and feelings of reconciliation can be explained by the number of reconciliation activities employed, i.e. which is larger in sectors with a higher percentage of genocide survivors.